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DIVISION OF  
CORPORATION FINANCE

UNITED STATES  
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549-3010

Received SEC March 2, 2009  
MAR 02 2009  
Washington, DC 20549

Andrew A. Gerber  
Hunton & Williams LLP  
Bank of America Plaza  
Suite 3500  
101 South Tryon Street  
Charlotte, NC 28280

Act: 1934  
Section: \_\_\_\_\_  
Rule: 149.8  
Public  
Availability: 3-2-09

Re: Bank of America Corporation  
Incoming letter dated February 11, 2009

Dear Mr. Gerber:

This is in response to your letter dated February 11, 2009 concerning the shareholder proposal submitted to Bank of America by Ray T. Chevedden. On February 3, 2009, we issued our response expressing our informal view that Bank of America could not exclude the proposal from its proxy materials for its upcoming annual meeting. You have asked us to reconsider our position. After reviewing the information contained in your letter, we find no basis to reconsider our position.

Sincerely,

Thomas J. Kim  
Chief Counsel & Associate Director

cc: John Chevedden



HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP  
BANK OF AMERICA PLAZA  
SUITE 3500  
101 SOUTH TRYON STREET  
CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA 28280

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ANDREW A. GERBER  
DIRECT DIAL: 704-378-4718  
EMAIL: agerber@hunton.com

FILE NO: 46123.74

February 11, 2009

Rule 14a-8

**BY ELECTRONIC MAIL**

Securities and Exchange Commission  
Office of Chief Counsel  
Division of Corporation Finance  
101 F. Street, N.E.  
Washington, DC 20549

**Re: Reconsideration Request  
Stockholder Proposal Submitted by John Chevedden (through Ray T. Chevedden)**

Ladies and Gentlemen:

By letters dated December 9, 2008 and December 19, 2008 (together, the "Initial Request"), Bank of America Corporation (the "Corporation") requested the concurrence of the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance (the "Division") that the Corporation could omit a shareholder proposal submitted by John Chevedden (through Ray T. Chevedden) (the "Proposal") from the proxy materials for the Corporation's 2009 Annual Meeting of Stockholders (the "2009 Annual Meeting"). In its response dated February 3, 2009 (received on February 6, 2009), the Division stated that it was unable to concur with the Corporation's view that the Proposal could be excluded. The Division's response is attached hereto as Exhibit A (and includes the Corporation's Initial Request).

Among other arguments, the Initial Request argued that the Proposal may be properly omitted from the proxy materials for the 2009 Annual Meeting pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(3) because the Proposal was vague and indefinite.

The Proposal asks the Corporation's Board "to take the steps necessary to amend [the Corporation's] bylaws and each appropriate governing document to give holders of 10% of [the Corporation's] outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage allowed by law above 10%) the power to call special shareowner meetings" and further provides that such "bylaw and/or charter text will not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) that apply only to shareowners but not to management and/or the board."



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Based on our Initial Request and the following discussion, we respectfully request the Division to reconsider its February 3, 2009 response and concur with the Corporation's view that the Proposal may be excluded pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(3).

In *General Electric Company* (January 26, 2009) ("GE") and *International Business Machines Corporation* (January 26, 2009) ("IBM"), the Division found that the following proposal could be excluded pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(3) because, in each case, it was vague and indefinite.

The proposal asks the board to take the steps necessary to amend the bylaws and each appropriate governing document to give holders of 10% of [the company's] outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage allowed by law above 10%) the power to call special shareowner meetings and further provides that such bylaw and/or charter text will not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) **applying to shareowners only and meanwhile not apply to management and/or the board.**

(emphasis added)

However, in *AT&T Inc.* (January 28, 2009) ("AT&T") and *Verizon Communications Inc.* (February 2, 2009) ("Verizon"), the Division found that the following proposal could not be excluded pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(3). The proposal in *AT&T, Inc.* and *Verizon* is the same as the Proposal submitted to the Corporation.

The proposal asks the board to take the steps necessary to amend the bylaws and each appropriate governing document to give holders of 10% of [the company's] outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage allowed by law above 10%) the power to call special shareowner meetings and further provides that such bylaw and/or charter text shall not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) **that apply only to shareowners but not to management and/or the board.**

(emphasis added)

The proposals in *GE* and *IBM*, on the one hand, and the proposals in *AT&T* and *Verizon* as well as the Proposal, on the other hand, are all identical to each other except for the highlighted clause in each proposal noted above. We believe that the Division has made a distinction where none exists. The *GE* and *IBM* language above is substantively the same and nearly identical to the *AT&T* and *Verizon* language above. The *AT&T* and *Verizon* language is no less vague and indefinite than the *GE* and *IBM* language.



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In each of *GE*, *IBM*, *AT&T* and *Verizon*, the first part of the proposal is the same-- it asks the board to amend the bylaws and each appropriate governing document to give holders of 10% of the company's outstanding common stock the power to call special shareowner meetings. Thus, pursuant to each proposal, in order to be eligible to call a special shareowner meeting, **the person calling the meeting must own 10%** (or the lowest percentage permitted by state law) of the company's common stock. The second part of the proposal creates the ambiguity and makes the proposal vague and indefinite. This is the case with both the *GE/IBM* and the *AT&T/Verizon* formulations of the proposal. Due to the flawed language of the proposal, the question becomes whether the 10% holding requirement applies to the board or management of the subject company. While Mr. Chevedden answers that question in the negative, stockholders at the 2009 Annual Meeting will only receive the text of the Proposal and not Mr. Chevedden's many clarifying statements.

In *GE* and *IBM*, the proposed amendment "will not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) **applying to shareowners only and meanwhile not apply to management and/or the board.**" The plain language indicates that the proposed amendment cannot have any exceptions or exclusions that are applicable only to shareowners but which are not, at the same time, applicable to management or the board. In effect, the company cannot establish additional requirements or hurdles for shareowners (such as the 10% stock ownership requirement) that are not applicable to management and the board as well.

In *AT&T* and *Verizon*, the proposed amendment "shall not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) **that apply only to shareowners but not to management and/or the board.**" Again, the company cannot establish additional requirements or hurdles for shareowners (such as the 10% stock ownership requirement) that are not applicable to management and the board as well.

Regardless of which version of the proposal is analyzed, the confusion is the same-- does the 10% holding requirement apply to the management's and board's ability to call a special meeting? We do not believe a reasonable distinction can be made between the two versions of the proposal or that the language of the *AT&T* and *Verizon* proposals provides sufficient clarity for stockholders. We do not believe that a stockholder could interpret the Proposal with certainty to conclude that the 10% holding requirement applies only to stockholders and not to management or the board.

The language of the Proposal and the proposals cited above is simply inconsistent on its face-- (1) the Proposal establishes an exclusion requirement for calling a special meeting (i.e., ownership of less than a specific amount of stock are excluded from the right to call a special meeting); (2) the Proposal prohibits unequal treatment between the shareowners on the one hand, and management and the board on the other hand (i.e., **no exceptions or exclusions** "applying to shareowners only and meanwhile not apply to management and/or the board" in *GE* and *IBM*; and **no exceptions or exclusions** "that apply only to shareowners but not to management and/or the board" in *AT&T*

# HUNTON & WILLIAMS

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and *Verizon*); and (3) the stock ownership exclusion set forth in (1) above does not apply to management or the board.

Mr. Chevedden recognizes the flawed language of his Proposal. As noted in our Initial Request, Mr. Chevedden argues both sides of the matter himself. On the one hand, Mr. Chevedden argues that the proposal seeks equality among stockholders and management and the Corporation's Board in the opportunity to call a special meeting. Yet at the same time, Mr. Chevedden argues that the 10% holding requirement is not intended to apply to management and the Corporation's Board.

The Proposal is poorly drafted and the operative language of the Proposal is both self-contradictory and, with respect to the second sentence, subject to alternative interpretations. In addition, the *GE/IBM* no-action letters and the *AT&T/Verizon* no-action letters establish inconsistent precedent for substantially similar proposals. Moreover, neither the Corporation's stockholders nor its Board would be able to determine with any certainty what actions the Corporation would be required to take in order to comply with the Proposal. Accordingly, we believe that the Proposal may be excluded in its entirety because it is vague and indefinite in violation of Rule 14a-8(i)(3).

\* \* \* \*

On the basis of the foregoing, the Corporation respectfully requests the reconsideration of the Division's February 3, 2009 response to the Initial Request. Based on the Corporation's timetable for the 2009 Annual Meeting, a response from the Division by February 20, 2009 would be of great assistance.

If you have any questions or would like any additional information regarding the foregoing, please do not hesitate to contact me at 704-378-4718 or, in my absence, Teresa M. Brenner, Associate General Counsel of the Corporation, at 980-386-4238.

Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

Very truly yours,



Andrew A. Gerber

cc: Teresa M. Brenner  
John Chevedden

**EXHIBIT A**

**See attached.**



UNITED STATES  
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549-3010

February 3, 2009

Andrew A. Gerber  
Hunton & Williams LLP  
Bank of America Plaza  
Suite 3500  
101 South Tryon Street  
Charlotte, NC 28280

Re: Bank of America Corporation  
Incoming letter dated December 9, 2008

Dear Mr. Gerber:

This is in response to your letters dated December 9, 2008 and December 19, 2008 concerning the shareholder proposal submitted to Bank of America by Ray T. Chevedden. We also have received letters on the proponent's behalf dated December 11, 2008, January 4, 2009, and January 20, 2009. Our response is attached to the enclosed photocopy of your correspondence. By doing this, we avoid having to recite or summarize the facts set forth in the correspondence. Copies of all of the correspondence also will be provided to the proponent.

In connection with this matter, your attention is directed to the enclosure, which sets forth a brief discussion of the Division's informal procedures regarding shareholder proposals.

Sincerely,

Heather L. Maples  
Senior Special Counsel

Enclosures

cc: John Chevedden

\*\*\*FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16\*\*\*

February 3, 2009

**Response of the Office of Chief Counsel  
Division of Corporation Finance**

Re: Bank of America Corporation  
Incoming letter dated December 9, 2008

The proposal asks the board to take the steps necessary to amend the bylaws and each appropriate governing document to give holders of 10% of Bank of America's outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage allowed by law above 10%) the power to call special shareowner meetings, and further provides that such bylaw and/or charter text shall not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) that apply only to shareowners but not to management and/or the board.

We are unable to concur in your view that Bank of America may exclude the proposal under rule 14a-8(i)(2). Accordingly, we do not believe that Bank of America may omit the proposal from its proxy materials in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(2).

We are unable to concur in your view that Bank of America may exclude the proposal under rule 14a-8(i)(3). Accordingly, we do not believe that Bank of America may omit the proposal from its proxy materials in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(3).

We are unable to concur in your view that Bank of America may exclude the proposal under rule 14a-8(i)(6). Accordingly, we do not believe that Bank of America may omit the proposal from its proxy materials in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(6).

Sincerely,

Julie F. Bell  
Attorney-Advisor





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ANDREW A. GERBER  
DIRECT DIAL: 704-378-4718  
EMAIL: agerber@hunton.com

FILE NO: 46123.74

December 9, 2008

Rule 14a-8

**BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY**

Securities and Exchange Commission  
Office of Chief Counsel  
Division of Corporation Finance  
101 F Street, N.E.  
Washington, DC 20549

RECEIVED  
14-0117 01:10:14  
CORPORATION FINANCE

Re: Stockholder Proposal Submitted by Ray T. Chevedden

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Pursuant to Rule 14a-8 promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act"), and as counsel to Bank of America Corporation, a Delaware corporation (the "Corporation"), we request confirmation that the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance (the "Division") will not recommend enforcement action if the Corporation omits from its proxy materials for the Corporation's 2009 Annual Meeting of Stockholders (the "2009 Annual Meeting") the proposal described below for the reasons set forth herein. The statements of fact included herein represent our understanding of such facts.

**GENERAL**

The Corporation received a proposal and supporting statement dated October 20, 2008, as updated on November 17, 2008 (the "Proposal"), from Ray T. Chevedden (the "Proponent") for inclusion in the proxy materials for the 2009 Annual Meeting. The Proposal is attached hereto as **Exhibit A**. The 2009 Annual Meeting is scheduled to be held on or about April 29, 2009. The Corporation intends to file its definitive proxy materials with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") on or about March 18, 2009.

Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(j) promulgated under the Exchange Act, enclosed are:

1. Six copies of this letter, which includes an explanation of why the Corporation believes that



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December 9, 2008

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it may exclude the Proposal;

2. Six copies of the Proposal; and
3. Six copies of the opinion of Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A., Delaware counsel.

A copy of this letter is also being sent to the Proponent as notice of the Corporation's intent to omit the Proposal from the Corporation's proxy materials for the 2009 Annual Meeting.

#### **SUMMARY OF PROPOSAL**

The Proposal asks the "board to take the steps necessary to amend our bylaws and each appropriate governing document to give holders of 10% of our outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage allowed by law above 10%) the power to call special shareowner meetings." (emphasis added) The Proposal further requires that the "bylaw and/or charter text will not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) that apply only to shareowners but not to management and/or the board."

#### **REASONS FOR EXCLUSION OF PROPOSAL**

The Corporation believes that the Proposal may be properly omitted from the proxy materials for the 2009 Annual Meeting pursuant to Rules 14a-8(i)(2) and (i)(6). The Proposal may be excluded pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(2) because, if implemented, it would cause the Corporation to violate Delaware law. The Proposal may also be excluded pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(6) because the Corporation lacks the power to implement the Proposal.

*1. The Corporation may omit the Proposal pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(2) because implementation of the Proposal would require the Corporation to violate Delaware law.*

Rule 14a-8(i)(2) permits a company to exclude a stockholder proposal if implementation of the proposal would cause it to violate any state, federal or foreign law to which it is subject. The Corporation is incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware. For the reasons set forth below and in the legal opinion regarding Delaware law from Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A., attached hereto as Exhibit B (the "RLF Opinion"), the Corporation believes that the Proposal is excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(2) because, if implemented, the Proposal would cause the Corporation to violate the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (the "DGCL").



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The first sentence of the Proposal requests that the Board of Directors of the Corporation (the "Board") "take the steps necessary" to amend the Corporation's Bylaws and each appropriate governing document to provide the holders of 10% of the Corporation's outstanding common stock with the power to call special meetings of stockholders. The second sentence of the Proposal provides that any "exception or exclusion conditions" applying to the stockholders' power to call a special meeting must also be applied to the Corporation's "management" or the Board. One "exception or exclusion condition" imposed on the stockholders' power to call special meetings under the Proposal is their holding 10% or more of the Corporation's outstanding common stock. Accordingly, the Proposal would have the effect of requiring the directors to hold at least 10% of the Corporation's outstanding common stock to call a special meeting of stockholders. As a result, for the reasons set forth below, the Proposal, if implemented, would violate the DGCL. This conclusion is supported by the RLF Opinion.

As noted in the RLF Opinion, Section 211(d) of the DGCL governs the calling of special meetings of stockholders. That subsection provides: "Special meetings of the stockholders may be called by the board of directors or by such person or persons as may be authorized by the certificate of incorporation or by the bylaws." Thus, Section 211(d) vests the board of directors of a Delaware corporation with the power to call special meetings, but gives the corporation the authority, through its certificate of incorporation or bylaws, to give other parties the right to call special meetings. The Proposal seeks to restrict the Board's power to call special meetings (other than through an ordinary process-based bylaw). Such limitation, however, cannot be implemented through the Corporation's Bylaws. Section 141(a) of the DGCL expressly provides that if there is to be any deviation from the general mandate that the board of directors manage the business and affairs of the corporation, such deviation must be provided in the DGCL or a company's certificate of incorporation. The Corporation's Certificate of Incorporation does not provide for any limitations on the Board's power to call special meetings, and, unlike other provisions of the DGCL that allow a board's statutory authority to be modified through the bylaws, Section 211(d) does not provide that the board's power to call special meetings may be modified through the bylaws. See 8 Del. C. § 211(d). Further, as discussed in the RLF Opinion, "the phrase 'except as otherwise provided in this chapter' set forth in Section 141(a) [of the DGCL] does not include bylaws adopted pursuant to Section 109(b) of the [DGCL] that could disable the board entirely from exercising its statutory power." A long line of Delaware case law discusses the implicit distinction found in Section 141 of the DGCL between the roles of stockholders and directors. In Aronson v. Lewis, the Delaware Supreme Court stated, "[a] cardinal precept of the [DGCL] is that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the corporation." Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). See also, McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916 (Del. 2000); Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1291 (Del. 1998). Thus, the Proposal, which seeks to amend the Corporation's Bylaws to include a provision conditioning the Board's power to call special



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meetings on the directors' ownership of at least 10% of the outstanding common stock, would, if implemented, violate the DGCL.

Because the Proposal seeks to modify or eliminate a "core" power of the Board, the Proposal may not be implemented through the Corporation's Certificate of Incorporation. Section 102(b)(1) of the DGCL provides that a certificate of incorporation may not contain any provisions contrary to the laws of the State of Delaware. As further explained in the RLF Opinion, any provision adopted pursuant to Section 102(b)(1) that is contrary to Delaware law would be invalid. See Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 118 (Del. 1952). Recently, in Jones Apparel Group, Inc. v. Maxwell Shoe Co., the Court suggested that certain statutory rights involving "core" director duties may not be modified or eliminated through a certificate of incorporation. Jones Apparel Group, Inc. v. Maxwell Shoe Co., 883 A.2d 837 (Del. Ch. 2004). In this case, the Court indicated that certain powers vested in the board, particularly those touching upon the directors' discharge of their fiduciary duties, are fundamental to the proper functioning of the corporation and therefore cannot be modified or eliminated. *Id.* at 852.

As discussed in the RLF Opinion, the board's statutory power to call special meeting without limitation or restriction under Section 211(d) of the DGCL is a "core" power reserved to the board. The RLF Opinion states that "[c]onsequently, any provision of a certificate of incorporation purporting to infringe upon that fundamental power (other than an ordinary process-based limitation) would be invalid." While a certificate of incorporation and/or bylaws may expand the ability of directors or other persons to call special meetings, a certificate of incorporation and/or bylaws may not limit the express power of the board of directors to call special meetings in the manner proposed in the Proposal.

Finally, as the RLF Opinion notes,

the "savings clause" that purports to limit the mandates of the Proposal "to the fullest extent permitted by state law" is a nullity. The "savings clause" does not resolve the conflict between the charter provision contemplated by the Proposal and the dictates of the General Corporation Law. Section 211(d), read together with Sections 102(b)(1) and 109(b), allows for no limitations on the board's power to call a special meeting (other than ordinary process-based limitations); thus, there is no "extent" to which the restriction on that power contemplated by the Proposal would otherwise be permitted by state law. In our view, the "savings clause" does little more than acknowledge that the Proposal, if implemented, would be invalid under the [DGCL].



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(footnote omitted) Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above and as supported by the RLF Opinion, the Corporation believes the Proposal is excludable pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(2) because implementation of the Proposal would cause the Corporation to violate applicable state law.

**2. The Corporation may omit the Proposal pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(6) because it lacks the power and authority to implement the Proposal.**

Rule 14a-8(i)(6) provides that a company may omit a proposal "if the company would lack the power or authority to implement the proposal." The discussion set forth in section 1 above is incorporated herein. As noted above, the Proposal cannot be implemented without violating Delaware law and accordingly, the Corporation lacks the power and authority to implement the Proposal. The Division has consistently permitted the exclusion of stockholder proposals pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(6) if a proposal would require the company to violate the law. See *Xerox Corporation* (February 23, 2004) and *SBC Communications Inc.* (January 11, 2004). Based on the foregoing, the Corporation lacks the power and legal authority to implement the Proposal and thus, the Proposal may be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(6).

## CONCLUSION

On the basis of the foregoing and on behalf of the Corporation, we respectfully request the concurrence of the Division that the Proposal may be excluded from the Corporation's proxy materials for the 2009 Annual Meeting. Based on the Corporation's timetable for the 2009 Annual Meeting, a response from the Division by February 3, 2009 would be of great assistance.

If you have any questions or would like any additional information regarding the foregoing, please do not hesitate to contact me at 704-378-4718 or, in my absence, Teresa M. Brenner, Associate General Counsel of the Corporation, at 704-386-4238.

Please acknowledge receipt of this letter by stamping and returning the enclosed receipt copy of this letter. Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

Very truly yours,

Andrew A. Gerber

cc: Teresa M. Brenner  
John Chevedden

**HUNTON &  
WILLIAMS**

**EXHIBIT A**

[BAC: Rule 14a-8 Proposal, October 20, 2008, Updated November 17, 2008]

**3 -- Special Shareowner Meetings**

**RESOLVED**, Shareowners ask our board to take the steps necessary to amend our bylaws and each appropriate governing document to give holders of 10% of our outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage allowed by law above 10%) the power to call special shareowner meetings. This includes that such bylaw and/or charter text will not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) that apply only to shareowners but not to management and/or the board.

**Statement of Ray T. Chevedden**

Special meetings allow shareowners to vote on important matters, such as electing new directors, that can arise between annual meetings. If shareowners cannot call special meetings, management may become insulated and investor returns may suffer. Shareowners should have the ability to call a special meeting when a matter is sufficiently important to merit prompt consideration.

Fidelity and Vanguard have supported a shareholder right to call a special meeting. The proxy voting guidelines of many public employee pension funds also favor this right. Governance ratings services, such as The Corporate Library and Governance Metrics International, take special meeting rights into consideration when assigning company ratings.

Merck (MRK) shareholders voted 57% in favor of a proposal for 10% of shareholders to have the right to call a special meeting. This proposal topic also won from 55% to 69%-support (based on 2008 yes and no votes) at the following companies:

Entergy (ETR)	55%	Emil Rossi (Sponsor)
International Business Machines (IBM)	56%	Emil Rossi
Kimberly-Clark (KMB)	61%	Chris Rossi
CSX Corp. (CSX)	63%	Children's Investment Fund
Occidental Petroleum (OXY)	66%	Emil Rossi
FirstEnergy Corp. (FE)	67%	Chris Rossi
Marathon Oil (MRO)	69%	Nick Rossi

Please encourage our board to respond positively to this proposal:

**Special Shareowner Meetings --**

**Yes on 3**

**Notes:**

Ray T. Chevedden,

\*\*\*FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16\*\*\*

submitted this proposal.

The above format is requested for publication without re-editing, re-formatting or elimination of text, including beginning and concluding text, unless prior agreement is reached. It is respectfully requested that this proposal be proofread before it is published in the definitive proxy to ensure that the integrity of the submitted format is replicated in the proxy materials. Please advise if there is any typographical question.

Please note that the title of the proposal is part of the argument in favor of the proposal. In the interest of clarity and to avoid confusion the title of this and each other ballot item is requested to be consistent throughout all the proxy materials.

The company is requested to assign a proposal number (represented by "3" above) based on the chronological order in which proposals are submitted. The requested designation of "3" or higher number allows for ratification of auditors to be item 2.

This proposal is believed to conform with Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14B (CF), September 15, 2004 including:

Accordingly, going forward, we believe that it would not be appropriate for companies to exclude supporting statement language and/or an entire proposal in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(3) in the following circumstances:

- the company objects to factual assertions because they are not supported;
- the company objects to factual assertions that, while not materially false or misleading, may be disputed or countered;
- the company objects to factual assertions because those assertions may be interpreted by shareholders in a manner that is unfavorable to the company, its directors, or its officers; and/or
- the company objects to statements because they represent the opinion of the shareholder proponent or a referenced source, but the statements are not identified specifically as such.

See also: Sun Microsystems, Inc. (July 21, 2005).

Stock will be held until after the annual meeting and the proposal will be presented at the annual meeting. Please acknowledge this proposal promptly by email.



**HUNTON &  
WILLIAMS**

**EXHIBIT B**



December 8, 2008

Bank of America Corporation  
Bank of America Corporate Center Fl 18  
100 N Tryon St  
Charlotte, NC 28255

Re: Stockholder Proposal Submitted by Ray T. Chevedden

Ladies and Gentlemen:

We have acted as special Delaware counsel to Bank of America Corporation, a Delaware corporation (the "Company"), in connection with a proposal (the "Proposal") submitted by Ray T. Chevedden (the "Proponent") that the Proponent intends to present at the Company's 2009 annual meeting of stockholders (the "Annual Meeting"). In this connection, you have requested our opinion as to a certain matter under the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (the "General Corporation Law").

For the purpose of rendering our opinion as expressed herein, we have been furnished and have reviewed the following documents:

(i) the Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of the Company, as filed with the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware (the "Secretary of State") on April 28, 1999, as amended by the Certificate of Amendment of Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of the Company, as filed with the Secretary of State on March 29, 2004 (collectively, the "Certificate of Incorporation");

(ii) the Bylaws of the Company, as amended on January 24, 2007 (the "Bylaws"); and

(iii) the Proposal and the supporting statement thereto.

With respect to the foregoing documents, we have assumed: (a) the genuineness of all signatures, and the incumbency, authority, legal right and power and legal capacity under all applicable laws and regulations, of each of the officers and other persons and entities signing or whose signatures appear upon each of said documents as or on behalf of the parties thereto; (b) the conformity to authentic originals of all documents submitted to us as certified,

■ ■ ■

One Rodney Square ■ 920 North King Street ■ Wilmington, DE 19801 ■ Phone: 302-651-7700 ■ Fax: 302-651-7701

RLF1-3345842-3

[www.rlf.com](http://www.rlf.com)

conformed, photostatic, electronic or other copies; and (c) that the foregoing documents, in the forms submitted to us for our review, have not been and will not be altered or amended in any respect material to our opinion as expressed herein. For the purpose of rendering our opinion as expressed herein, we have not reviewed any document other than the documents set forth above, and, except as set forth in this opinion, we assume there exists no provision of any such other document that bears upon or is inconsistent with our opinion as expressed herein. We have conducted no independent factual investigation of our own, but rather have relied solely upon the foregoing documents, the statements and information set forth therein, and the additional matters recited or assumed herein, all of which we assume to be true, complete and accurate in all material respects.

#### The Proposal

The Proposal reads as follows:

RESOLVED, Shareowners ask our board to take the steps necessary to amend our bylaws and each appropriate governing document to give holders of 10% of our outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage allowed by law above 10%) the power to call special shareowner meetings. This includes that such bylaw and/or charter text will not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) that apply only to shareowners but not to management and/or the board.

#### Discussion

You have asked our opinion as to whether implementation of the Proposal would violate Delaware law. For the reasons set forth below, in our opinion, implementation of the Proposal by the Company would violate the General Corporation Law.

The first sentence of the Proposal requests that the Board of Directors of the Company (the "Board") "take the steps necessary" to amend the Bylaws and/or Certificate of Incorporation to provide the holders of 10% of the Company's outstanding common stock with the power to call special meetings of stockholders. The second sentence of the Proposal provides that any "exception or exclusion conditions" applying to the stockholders' power to call a special meeting must also be applied to the Company's "management" or the Board. One "exception or exclusion condition" imposed on the stockholders' power to call special meetings under the Proposal is their holding 10% or more of the Company's outstanding common stock. As applied equally to the Board pursuant to the language of the Proposal, this exception would require the directors to hold at least 10% of the Company's outstanding common stock to call a special meeting of stockholders. For purposes of this opinion, we have assumed that the Proposal would be read to have this effect. Notably, the Proposal does not seek to impose a process-based limitation on the Board's power to call special meetings (e.g., requiring unanimous Board approval to call special meetings), but instead purports to preclude the Board from calling special

meetings unless the directors have satisfied an external condition—namely, the ownership of 10% of the Company's outstanding common stock—that is unrelated to the process through which the Board makes decisions. As a result of this restriction, for the reasons set forth below, the Proposal, if implemented, would violate the General Corporation Law.

Section 211(d) of the General Corporation Law governs the calling of special meetings of stockholders. That subsection provides: "Special meetings of the stockholders may be called by the board of directors or by such person or persons as may be authorized by the certificate of incorporation or by the bylaws." 8 Del. C. § 211(d). Thus, Section 211(d) vests the board of directors with the power to call special meetings, but gives the corporation the authority, through its certificate of incorporation or bylaws, to give other parties the right to call special meetings. In considering whether implementation of the Proposal would violate the General Corporation Law, the relevant question is whether a provision conditioning the Board's power to call special meetings on the directors' ownership of at least 10% of the outstanding common stock would be valid if included in the Certificate of Incorporation or Bylaws. In our opinion, such a provision, whether included in the Certificate of Incorporation or Bylaws, would be invalid.

**A. The Provision Contemplated by the Proposal May Not Be Validly Included in the Bylaws.**

Because the Proposal seeks to restrict the Board's power to call special meetings (other than through an ordinary process-based bylaw)<sup>1</sup>, the Proposal could not be implemented through the Bylaws. The directors of a Delaware corporation are vested with the power and authority to manage the business and affairs of the corporation. Section 141(a) of the General Corporation Law provides, in relevant part, as follows:

The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of

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<sup>1</sup> The Delaware courts have distinguished "process-oriented" bylaws regulating the procedures through which board decisions are made from bylaws that purport to intrude upon the board's substantive decision-making authority. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 234-35 (Del. 2008) (footnotes omitted) ("It is well-established Delaware law that a proper function of bylaws is not to mandate how the board should decide specific substantive business decisions, but rather, to define the process and procedures by which those decisions are made. . . . Examples of the procedural, process-oriented nature of bylaws are found in both the DGCL and the case law. For example, 8 Del. C. § 141(b) authorizes bylaws that fix the number of directors on the board, the number of directors required for a quorum (with certain limitations), and the vote requirements for board action. 8 Del. C. § 141(f) authorizes bylaws that preclude board action without a meeting.").

directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.

8 Del. C. § 141(a) (emphasis added). Section 141(a) expressly provides that if there is to be any deviation from the general mandate that the board of directors manage the business and affairs of the corporation, such deviation must be provided in the General Corporation Law or the certificate of incorporation. Id.; see, e.g., Lehrman v. Cohen, 222 A.2d 800, 808 (Del. 1966). The Certificate of Incorporation does not provide for any limitations on the Board's power to call special meetings, and, unlike other provisions of the General Corporation Law that allow the Board's statutory authority to be modified through the bylaws,<sup>2</sup> Section 211(d) does not provide that the board's power to call special meetings may be modified through the bylaws. See 8 Del. C. § 211(d). Moreover, the phrase "except as otherwise provided in this chapter" set forth in Section 141(a) does not include bylaws adopted pursuant to Section 109(b) of the General Corporation Law that could disable the board entirely from exercising its statutory power. In CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 234-35 (Del. 2008), the Delaware Supreme Court, when attempting to determine "the scope of shareholder action that Section 109(b) permits yet does not improperly intrude upon the directors' power to manage [the] corporation's business and affairs under Section 141(a)," indicated that while reasonable bylaws governing the board's decision-making process are generally valid, those purporting to divest the board entirely of its substantive decision-making power and authority are not. See id. ("It is well-established Delaware law that a proper function of bylaws is not to mandate how the board should decide specific substantive business decisions, but rather, to define the process and procedures by which those decisions are made. . . . Traditionally, the bylaws have been the corporate instrument used to set forth the rules by which the corporate board conducts its business.").

The Court's observations in CA are consistent with the long line of Delaware cases highlighting the distinction implicit in Section 141(a) of the General Corporation Law between the role of stockholders and the role of the board of directors. As the Delaware Supreme Court has stated, "[a] cardinal precept of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware is that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the corporation." Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984). See also McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916 (Del. 2000) ("One of the fundamental principles of the Delaware General Corporation Law statute is that the business affairs of a corporation are managed by or under the direction of its board of directors.") (citing 8 Del. C. § 141(a)); Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1291 (Del. 1998) ("One of the most basic tenets of Delaware corporate law is that the board of directors has the ultimate responsibility for managing the business and affairs of a corporation.") (footnote omitted). The rationale for these statements is as follows:

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<sup>2</sup> For example, Section 141(f) authorizes the board to act by unanimous written consent "[u]nless otherwise restricted by the certificate of incorporation or bylaws." See 8 Del. C. § 141(f).

Stockholders are the equitable owners of the corporation's assets. However, the corporation is the legal owner of its property and the stockholders do not have any specific interest in the assets of the corporation. Instead, they have the right to share in the profits of the company and in the distribution of its assets on liquidation. Consistent with this division of interests, the directors rather than the stockholders manage the business and affairs of the corporation and the directors, in carrying out their duties, act as fiduciaries for the company and its stockholders.

Norte & Co. v. Manor Healthcare Corp., C.A. Nos. 6827, 6831, slip op. at 9 (Del. Ch. Nov. 21, 1985) (citations omitted); see also Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc., C.A. Nos. 10866, 10670, 10935, slip op. at 77-78 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) ("The corporation law does not operate on the theory that directors, in exercising their powers to manage the firm, are obligated to follow the wishes of a majority of shares.")<sup>3</sup> Because the bylaw contemplated by the Proposal would go well beyond governing the process through which the Board determines whether to call special meetings – in fact, it would potentially have the effect of disabling the Board from exercising its statutorily-granted power to call special meetings – such bylaw would be invalid under the General Corporation Law.

**B. The Provision Contemplated by the Proposal May Not Be Validly Included in the Certificate of Incorporation.**

Because the Proposal seeks to modify or eliminate a "core" power of the Board, the Proposal may not be implemented through the Certificate of Incorporation. Section 102(b)(1) of the General Corporation Law provides that a certificate of incorporation may contain:

Any provision for the management of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation, and any provision creating, defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the corporation, the directors, and the stockholders, or any class of the stockholders . . . ; if such provisions are not contrary to the laws of [the State of Delaware].

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<sup>3</sup> But see UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp., 2005 WL 3529317 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2005). In that case, the Court held that a board of directors could agree, by adopting a board policy and promising not to subsequently revoke the policy, to submit the final decision whether to adopt a stockholder rights plan to a vote of the corporation's stockholders. The board's voluntary agreement to contractually limit its discretion in UniSuper, however, is distinguishable from the instant case. The bylaw contemplated by the Proposal, if adopted by the stockholders and implemented, would potentially result in stockholders divesting the Board of its statutory power to call special meetings.

8 Del. C. § 102(b)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, a corporation's ability to curtail the directors' powers through the certificate of incorporation is not without limitation. Any provision adopted pursuant to Section 102(b)(1) that is otherwise contrary to Delaware law would be invalid. In Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 118 (Del. 1952), the Court found that a charter provision is "contrary to the laws of [Delaware]" if it transgresses "a statutory enactment or a public policy settled by the common law or implicit in the General Corporation Law itself."

The Court in Loew's Theatres, Inc. v. Commercial Credit Co., 243 A.2d 78, 81 (Del. Ch. 1968), adopted this view, noting that "a charter provision which seeks to waive a statutory right or requirement is unenforceable." More recently, the Court in Jones Apparel Group, Inc. v. Maxwell Shoe Co., 883 A.2d 837 (Del. Ch. 2004), suggested that certain statutory rights involving "core" director duties may not be modified or eliminated through the certificate of incorporation. The Jones Apparel Court observed:

[Sections] 242(b)(1) and 251 do not contain the magic words ["unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation"] and they deal respectively with the fundamental subjects of certificate amendments and mergers. Can a certificate provision divest a board of its statutory power to approve a merger? Or to approve a certificate of amendment? Without answering those questions, I think it fair to say that those questions inarguably involve far more serious intrusions on core director duties than does [the provision at issue]. I also think that the use by our judiciary of a more context- and statute-specific approach to police "horribles" is preferable to a sweeping rule that denudes § 102(b)(1) of its utility and thereby greatly restricts the room for private ordering under the DGCL.

Id. at 852. While the Court in Jones Apparel recognized that certain provisions for the regulation of the internal affairs of the corporation may be made subject to modification or elimination through the private ordering system of the certificate of incorporation and bylaws, it indicated that other powers vested in the board—particularly those touching upon the directors' discharge of their fiduciary duties—are so fundamental to the proper functioning of the corporation that they cannot be so modified or eliminated. Id.

The structure of, and legislative history surrounding, Section 211(d) confirm that the board's statutory power to call special meetings, without limitation or restriction, is a "core" power reserved to the board. Consequently, any provision of the certificate of incorporation purporting to infringe upon that fundamental power (other than an ordinary process-based limitation) would be invalid. As noted above, Section 211(d) provides that "[s]pecial meetings of the stockholders may be called by the board of directors or by such person or persons as may be authorized by the certificate of incorporation or by the bylaws." Section 211(d) was adopted in 1967 as part of the wholesale revision of the General Corporation Law. In the review of Delaware's corporate law prepared for the committee tasked with submitting the revisions, it was

noted, in respect of then-proposed Section 211(d), "[m]any states specify in greater or less detail who may call special stockholder meetings," and it was "suggested that the common understanding be codified by providing that special meetings may be called by the board of directors or by any other person authorized by the by-laws or the certificate of incorporation." Ernest L. Folk, III, Review of the Delaware Corporation Law for the Delaware Corporation Law Revision Committee, at 112 (1968). It was further noted that "it is unnecessary (and for Delaware, undesirable) to vest named officers, or specified percentages of shareholders (usually 10%), with statutory, as distinguished from by-law, authority to call special meetings . . ." *Id.* The language of the statute, along with the gloss provided by the legislative history, clearly suggests that the power to call special meetings is vested by statute in the board, without limitation, and that other parties may be granted the right to do so through the certificate of incorporation and bylaws. While the certificate of incorporation and/or bylaws may expand the statutory default with regard to the calling of special meetings (*i.e.*, parties other than the board of directors may be authorized to call special meetings), the certificate of incorporation and/or bylaws may not limit the express power of the board of directors to call special meetings, except through ordinary process-based limitations.

That the board of directors' power to call special meetings must remain unfettered (other than through ordinary process-based limitations)<sup>4</sup> is consistent with the most fundamental precept of the General Corporation Law: the board of directors is charged with a fiduciary duty to manage the business and affairs of the corporation. That duty may require the board of directors to call a special meeting at any time (regardless of the directors' ownership of the corporation's then-outstanding stock) to present a significant matter to a vote of the stockholders. Indeed, the Delaware courts have indicated that the calling of special meetings is one of the principal acts falling within the board's duty to manage the business and affairs of the corporation. *See Campbell v. Loew's, Inc.*, 134 A.2d 852, 856 (Del. Ch. 1957) (upholding a bylaw granting the corporation's president the power to call special meetings and noting that the grant of such power did "not impinge upon the statutory right and duty of the board to manage the business of the corporation"). "[T]he fiduciary duty of a Delaware director is unremitting," *Malone v. Brincat*, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998). It does not abate during those times when the directors fail to meet a specified stock-ownership threshold. As the Delaware Supreme Court has stated, "[a] cardinal precept of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware is that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the corporation." *Aronson*, 473 A.2d at 811. *See also Quickturn Design*, 721 A.2d at 1291 ("One of the most basic tenets of Delaware corporate law is that the board of directors has the ultimate responsibility for managing the business and affairs of a corporation.") (footnote omitted).

Finally, the "savings clause" that purports to limit the mandates of the Proposal "to the fullest extent permitted by state law" is a nullity. The "savings clause" does not resolve the conflict between the charter provision contemplated by the Proposal and the dictates of the General Corporation Law. Section 211(d), read together with Sections 102(b)(1) and 109(b),

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<sup>4</sup> *See supra*, n. 1.



allows for no limitations on the board's power to call a special meeting (other than ordinary process-based limitations)<sup>5</sup>; thus, there is no "extent" to which the restriction on that power contemplated by the Proposal would otherwise be permitted by state law. In our view, the "savings clause" does little more than acknowledge that the Proposal, if implemented, would be invalid under the General Corporation Law.

**Conclusion**

Based upon and subject to the foregoing, and subject to the limitations stated herein, it is our opinion that the Proposal, if adopted by the stockholders and implemented by the Board, would be invalid under the General Corporation Law.

The foregoing opinion is limited to the General Corporation Law. We have not considered and express no opinion on any other laws or the laws of any other state or jurisdiction, including federal laws regulating securities or any other federal laws, or the rules and regulations of stock exchanges or of any other regulatory body.

The foregoing opinion is rendered solely for your benefit in connection with the matters addressed herein. We understand that you may furnish a copy of this opinion letter to the SEC in connection with the matters addressed herein and that you may refer to it in your proxy statement for the Annual Meeting, and we consent to your doing so. Except as stated in this paragraph, this opinion letter may not be furnished or quoted to, nor may the foregoing opinion be relied upon by, any other person or entity for any purpose without our prior written consent.

Very truly yours,

*Richards, Jay H.; Ryan, P.A.*

CSB/TNP

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<sup>5</sup> See supra, n. 1.

**JOHN CHEVEDDEN**

\*\*\*FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16\*\*\*

\*\*\*FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16\*\*\*

December 11, 2008

Office of Chief Counsel  
Division of Corporation Finance  
Securities and Exchange Commission  
100 F Street, NE  
Washington, DC 20549

**# 1 Bank of America Corporation (BAC)  
Shareholder Position on Company No-Action Request  
Rule 14a-8 Proposal: Special Shareholder Meetings  
Ray T. Chevedden**

Ladies and Gentlemen:

This is the first response to the company December 9, 2008 no action request regarding this rule 14a-8 proposal with the following resolved statement:

**Special Shareowner Meetings**

**RESOLVED**, Shareowners ask our board to take the steps necessary to amend our bylaws and each appropriate governing document to give holders of 10% of our outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage allowed by law above 10%) the power to call special shareowner meetings. This includes that such bylaw and/or charter text will not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) that apply only to shareowners but not to management and/or the board.

The second sentence of the proposal states, "This [special shareholder meeting bylaw amendment to give holders of 10% of outstanding common stock the power to call special shareowner meetings] includes that such bylaw and/or charter text will not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) that apply only to shareowners but not to management and/or the board."

The company seems to read the proposal backwards. The primary purpose of this proposal is to give shareholders a real opportunity to call a special meeting as opposed to a hamstrung opportunity. For instance this proposal seeks to avoid an amendment that gives shareholders a right to call a special meeting yet excludes shareholders only from calling a special meeting to elect a director(s).

There is no text in the proposal that objects to the board having the power to call a special meeting or argues that the board's right to call a special meeting needs to be restricted. The company does not state that any other text in the proposal purportedly supports its backward read of the meaning of the resolved statement. It is believed the proposal seeks a certain equality (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) in opportunity to call a special meeting for shareholders and the board.

If the company insists on reading a backward and unintended meaning into the proposal, the

phrase "(to the fullest extent permitted by state law)" would prevent this proposal from having any impact on the right of the board to call a special meeting.

For these reasons it is requested that the staff find that this resolution cannot be omitted from the company proxy. It is also respectfully requested that the shareholder have the last opportunity to submit material in support of including this proposal – since the company had the first opportunity.

Sincerely,



John Chevedden

cc:

Ray T. Chevedden

Kristin Oberheu <Kristin.M.Oberheu@bankofamerica.com>

[BAC: Rule 14a-8 Proposal, October 20, 2008, Updated November 17, 2008]

**3 – Special Shareowner Meetings**

**RESOLVED**, Shareowners ask our board to take the steps necessary to amend our bylaws and each appropriate governing document to give holders of 10% of our outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage allowed by law above 10%) the power to call special shareowner meetings. This includes that such bylaw and/or charter text will not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) that apply only to shareowners but not to management and/or the board.

**Statement of Ray T. Chevedden**

Special meetings allow shareowners to vote on important matters, such as electing new directors, that can arise between annual meetings. If shareowners cannot call special meetings, management may become insulated and investor returns may suffer. Shareowners should have the ability to call a special meeting when a matter is sufficiently important to merit prompt consideration.

Fidelity and Vanguard have supported a shareholder right to call a special meeting. The proxy voting guidelines of many public employee pension funds also favor this right. Governance ratings services, such as The Corporate Library and Governance Metrics International, take special meeting rights into consideration when assigning company ratings.

Merck (MRK) shareholders voted 57% in favor of a proposal for 10% of shareholders to have the right to call a special meeting. This proposal topic also won from 55% to 69%-support (based on 2008 yes and no votes) at the following companies:

Entergy (ETR)	55%	Emil Rossi (Sponsor)
International Business Machines (IBM)	56%	Emil Rossi
Kimberly-Clark (KMB)	61%	Chris Rossi
CSX Corp. (CSX)	63%	Children's Investment Fund
Occidental Petroleum (OXY)	66%	Emil Rossi
FirstEnergy Corp. (FE)	67%	Chris Rossi
Marathon Oil (MRO)	69%	Nick Rossi

Please encourage our board to respond positively to this proposal:

**Special Shareowner Meetings –  
Yes on 3**

**Notes:**

Ray T. Chevedden, \*\*\*FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16\*\*\* submitted this proposal.

The above format is requested for publication without re-editing, re-formatting or elimination of text, including beginning and concluding text, unless prior agreement is reached. It is respectfully requested that this proposal be proofread before it is published in the definitive proxy to ensure that the integrity of the submitted format is replicated in the proxy materials. Please advise if there is any typographical question.

Please note that the title of the proposal is part of the argument in favor of the proposal. In the interest of clarity and to avoid confusion the title of this and each other ballot item is requested to be consistent throughout all the proxy materials.

The company is requested to assign a proposal number (represented by "3" above) based on the chronological order in which proposals are submitted. The requested designation of "3" or higher number allows for ratification of auditors to be item 2.

This proposal is believed to conform with Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14B (CF), September 15, 2004 including:

Accordingly, going forward, we believe that it would not be appropriate for companies to exclude supporting statement language and/or an entire proposal in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(3) in the following circumstances:

- the company objects to factual assertions because they are not supported;
- the company objects to factual assertions that, while not materially false or misleading, may be disputed or countered;
- the company objects to factual assertions because those assertions may be interpreted by shareholders in a manner that is unfavorable to the company, its directors, or its officers; and/or
- the company objects to statements because they represent the opinion of the shareholder proponent or a referenced source, but the statements are not identified specifically as such.

See also: Sun Microsystems, Inc. (July 21, 2005).

Stock will be held until after the annual meeting and the proposal will be presented at the annual meeting. Please acknowledge this proposal promptly by email.



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December 19, 2008

Rule 14a-8

**BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY**

Securities and Exchange Commission  
Office of Chief Counsel  
Division of Corporation Finance  
100 F Street, N.E.  
Washington, DC 20549

Re: Supplemental Letter for Stockholder Proposal Submitted by Ray T. Chevedden (through John Chevedden)

Ladies and Gentlemen:

By letter dated December 9, 2008 (the "Initial Letter"), on behalf of Bank of America Corporation (the "Corporation"), we requested confirmation that the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance (the "Division") would not recommend enforcement action if the Corporation omitted a proposal (the "Proposal") received from John Chevedden on behalf of Ray T. Chevedden (the "Proponent") from its proxy materials for the 2009 Annual Meeting for the reasons set forth therein. The Initial Letter is attached hereto as Exhibit A. This letter is also in response to a letter from John Chevedden dated December 11, 2008, which is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

As counsel to the Corporation, we hereby supplement the Initial Letter and request confirmation that the Division will not recommend enforcement action if the Corporation omits the Proposal from its proxy materials for the 2009 Annual Meeting for the additional reason set forth herein. This letter is intended to supplement, but does not replace, the Initial Letter.

**GENERAL**

As stated in the Initial Letter, the 2009 Annual Meeting is scheduled to be held on or about April 29, 2009. The Corporation intends to file its definitive proxy materials with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") on or about March 18, 2009.



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Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(j) promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act"), enclosed are:

1. Six copies of this letter, which includes an explanation of why the Corporation believes that it may exclude the Proposal; and
2. Six copies of Exhibit A, which include the Proposal.

A copy of this letter is also being sent to the Proponent as notice of the Corporation's intention to omit the Proposal from the Corporation's proxy materials for the 2009 Annual Meeting.

#### SUMMARY OF PROPOSAL

The Proposal asks the "board to take the steps necessary to amend our bylaws *and* each appropriate governing document to give holders of 10% of our outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage allowed by law above 10%) the power to call special shareowner meetings." (emphasis added) The Proposal further requires that the "bylaw and/or charter text will not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) that apply only to shareowners but not to management and/or the board."

#### ADDITIONAL REASON FOR EXCLUSION OF PROPOSAL

Rule 14a-8(i)(3) permits the exclusion of a stockholder proposal if the proposal or its supporting statement is contrary to the Commission's proxy rules, including Rule 14a-9, which prohibits false and misleading statements in proxy soliciting materials and Rule 14a-4, which requires information included in a proxy statement to be clearly presented. The Division has consistently taken the position that stockholder proposals that are vague and indefinite are inherently misleading and thus may be omitted from a company's proxy materials under Rule 14a-8(i)(3). Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14B provides that a stockholder proposal may be omitted under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) where "the resolution contained in the proposal is so inherently vague or indefinite that neither the stockholders voting on the proposal, nor the company in implementing the proposal (if adopted), would be able to determine with any reasonable certainty exactly what actions or measures the proposal requires." The Division has consistently deemed a proposal to be impermissibly vague or indefinite where the proposal calls for the company to adopt, consider or abide by a standard or set of standards established by a third party without describing the substantive provisions of the standards or guidelines. *See e.g., Smithfield Foods, Inc. (July 18, 2003)* (permitting exclusion of a proposal requesting management to prepare a report based on the "Global Reporting Initiatives guidelines" where the proposal did not contain a description of the guidelines).

In particular, the Division has concurred with the exclusion of numerous proposals seeking to amend a company's charter or bylaws because they were vague and indefinite. *See Alaska Air*



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*Group Inc.* (April 11, 2007) (proposal requesting that the company's board amend the company's governing instruments to "assert, affirm and define the right of the owners of the company to set standards of corporate governance" was vague and indefinite) and *Peoples Energy Corp.* (December 10, 2004) (proposal requesting that the board amend the charter and by-laws "to provide that officers and directors shall not be indemnified from personal liability for acts or omissions involving gross negligence or 'reckless neglect'" was vague and indefinite). The Division has also found similar proposals submitted by John Chevedden on behalf of various proponents that were excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) because they were vague and indefinite. See *Raytheon Co.* (March 28, 2008); *Office Depot Inc.* (February 25, 2008); *Mattel Inc.* (February 22, 2008); and *Exxon Mobil Corp.* (January 28, 2008) (all relating to proposals that the board of directors amend a company's "bylaws and [/or] any other appropriate governing documents in order that there is no restriction on the shareholder right to call a special meeting").

Proposals that are subject to misinterpretation, alternative interpretation or that contain internal inconsistencies have also been found to be excludable by the Division under Rule 14a-8. See *Bank of America Corp.* (June 18, 2007) (proposal calling for the board of directors to compile a report "concerning the thinking of the Directors concerning representative payees" as "vague and indefinite"); *Puget Energy, Inc.* (March 7, 2002) (proposal requesting that the company's board of directors "take the necessary steps to implement a policy of 'improved corporate governance'"); and *Fuqua Industries, Inc.* (March 12, 1991). In *Verizon Communications Inc.* (February 21, 2008) ("*Verizon Communications*"), a proposal was excludable as vague and indefinite where the proposed method for calculating a compensation award was inconsistent with the proposed maximum size limitation of compensation awards. The application of the two requirements (i.e., method for calculation and award size limitations) in *Verizon Communications* created inconsistent results because the method of calculation resulted in awards exceeding the maximum limit. In *Philadelphia Electric Co.* (July 30, 1992), a proposal was excludable because it was susceptible to multiple interpretations due to ambiguous syntax and grammar, was "so inherently vague and indefinite that neither the shareholders . . . nor the company . . . would be able to determine with any reasonable certainty exactly what actions or-measures the proposal requires."

The Proposal is poorly drafted and, as a result, neither the Corporation nor its stockholders can determine the measures requested by the Proposal. The Proposal itself is internally inconsistent. The Division's position with respect to the drafting of proposals is clear—proposals should be drafted with precision. See *Staff Legal Bulletin 14* and *Teleconference: Shareholder Proposals: What to Expect in the 2002 Proxy Season* (November 26, 2001). In a November 26, 2001 teleconference, "*Shareholder Proposals. What to Expect in the 2002 Proxy Season,*" the Associate Director (Legal) of the Division (the "Associate Director") emphasized the importance of precision in drafting a proposal, citing *Staff Legal Bulletin 14* ("SLB 14"). The Associate Director stated, "you really need to read the *exact wording* of the proposal . . . . We really wanted to explain that to folks, and we took a lot of time to make it very, very clear in [SLB 14]." (emphasis added)





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Question B.6 of Staff Legal Bulletin 14 states that the Division's determination of no-action requests under Rule 14a-8 of the Exchange Act is based on, among other things, the "way in which a proposal is drafted." As a professional shareholder proponent, the Proponent should be expected to know the rules regarding precision in drafting proposals and should not be afforded any concessions due to imprecise wording of the Proposal. As discussed below, the Proposal includes the specific requirement that only stockholders holding 10% of the Corporation's shares may call a special meeting, which conflicts with the Proposal's general requirement that there be no exception or exclusion conditions.

The Proposal consists of two sentences that, when read together, are inconsistent. The first sentence requests that the Corporation's Board of Directors (the "Board") "take the steps necessary to amend our bylaws and each appropriate governing document to give holders of 10% of our outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage allowed by law above 10%) the power to call special shareowner meetings." In addition, the second sentence requires that "such bylaw and/or charter text will not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) that apply only to shareowners but not to management and/or the board." Notwithstanding the requirements of the second sentence, the amendment requested in the first sentence of the Proposal includes an express "exclusion condition" (i.e., that holders of less than 10% of the Company's outstanding common stock cannot call a special meeting of shareowners). In addition, under Delaware law, neither management nor a board is required to own 10% of the outstanding common stock as a condition on their authority to call a special meeting. Thus, the Proposal establishes an "exception" that would apply "only to shareowners but not to management and/or the board." Accordingly, the amendment requested in the first sentence of the Proposal is inconsistent with the requirements of the second sentence of the Proposal; neither the Corporation nor its stockholders can know what is being proposed or required.

In addition, as noted in the Initial Letter, the second sentence of the Proposal is itself so vague and ambiguous that it is impossible to ascertain what the Proposal requires. That sentence provides that "such bylaw and/or charter text will not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) that apply only to shareowners but not to management and/or the board." This language results in at least two reasonable interpretations. The first such interpretation was set forth in the Initial Letter. The second possible interpretation was put forth by Mr. Chevedden in his December 11, 2008 letter. The first interpretation is that the proposed amendment requires stockholders and management and/or the Board to be subject to identical conditions and exclusions with respect to the calling of special meetings (i.e., there can be no "exception or exclusion conditions" that apply only to stockholders but not to management and/or the board).<sup>1</sup> The second interpretation, as posited by Mr. Chevedden in his December 11, 2008

<sup>1</sup> We note that the Proponent's statements support the first interpretation of the Proposal when he argues in his December 11, 2007 letter that the Proposal seeks equality among stockholders and management and the Board in the opportunity to call a special meeting.



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letter, is that the Proposal does not restrict management's or the Board's right to call a special meeting and that the express exclusion condition set forth in the first sentence of the Proposal (i.e., the 10% ownership requirement) does not apply to management and/or the Board.

The Proposal is poorly drafted and the operative language of the Proposal is both self-contradictory and, with respect to the second sentence, subject to alternative interpretations. Moreover, neither the Corporation's stockholders nor its board would be able to determine with any certainty what actions the Corporation would be required to take in order to comply with the Proposal. Accordingly, we believe that the Proposal may be excluded in its entirety because it is vague and indefinite in violation of Rule 14a-8(1)(3).

#### CONCLUSION

On the basis of the foregoing and on behalf of the Corporation, we respectfully request the concurrence of the Division that the Proposal may be excluded from the Corporation's proxy materials for the 2009 Annual Meeting. Based on the Corporation's timetable for the 2009 Annual Meeting, a response from the Division by February 3, 2009 would be of great assistance.

If you have any questions or would like any additional information regarding the foregoing, please do not hesitate to contact me at 704-378-4718 or, in my absence, Teresa M. Brenner, Associate General Counsel of the Corporation, at 704-386-4238.

Please acknowledge receipt of this letter by stamping and returning the enclosed receipt copy of this letter. Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

Very truly yours,

Andrew A. Gerber

cc: Teresa M. Brenner  
John Chevedden

**HUNTON &  
WILLIAMS**

**EXHIBIT A**

**See attached.**



HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP  
BANK OF AMERICA PLAZA  
SUITE 3500  
101 SOUTH TRYON STREET  
CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA 28280

TEL 704-378-4700  
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ANDREW A. GERBER  
DIRECT DIAL: 704-378-4718  
EMAIL: [agerber@hutton.com](mailto:agerber@hutton.com)

FILE NO: 46123.74

December 9, 2008

Rule 14a-8

**BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY**

Securities and Exchange Commission  
Office of Chief Counsel  
Division of Corporation Finance  
101 F Street, N.E.  
Washington, DC 20549

Re: Stockholder Proposal Submitted by Ray T. Chevedden

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Pursuant to Rule 14a-8 promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act"), and as counsel to Bank of America Corporation, a Delaware corporation (the "Corporation"), we request confirmation that the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance (the "Division") will not recommend enforcement action if the Corporation omits from its proxy materials for the Corporation's 2009 Annual Meeting of Stockholders (the "2009 Annual Meeting") the proposal described below for the reasons set forth herein. The statements of fact included herein represent our understanding of such facts.

**GENERAL**

The Corporation received a proposal and supporting statement dated October 20, 2008, as updated on November 17, 2008 (the "Proposal"), from Ray T. Chevedden (the "Proponent") for inclusion in the proxy materials for the 2009 Annual Meeting. The Proposal is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The 2009 Annual Meeting is scheduled to be held on or about April 29, 2009. The Corporation intends to file its definitive proxy materials with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") on or about March 18, 2009.

Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(j) promulgated under the Exchange Act, enclosed are:

1. Six copies of this letter, which includes an explanation of why the Corporation believes that



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it may exclude the Proposal;

2. Six copies of the Proposal; and
3. Six copies of the opinion of Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A., Delaware counsel.

A copy of this letter is also being sent to the Proponent as notice of the Corporation's intent to omit the Proposal from the Corporation's proxy materials for the 2009 Annual Meeting.

#### **SUMMARY OF PROPOSAL**

The Proposal asks the "board to take the steps necessary to amend our bylaws and each appropriate governing document to give holders of 10% of our outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage allowed by law above 10%) the power to call special shareowner meetings." (emphasis added) The Proposal further requires that the "bylaw and/or charter text will not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) that apply only to shareowners but not to management and/or the board."

#### **REASONS FOR EXCLUSION OF PROPOSAL**

The Corporation believes that the Proposal may be properly omitted from the proxy materials for the 2009 Annual Meeting pursuant to Rules 14a-8(i)(2) and (i)(6). The Proposal may be excluded pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(2) because, if implemented, it would cause the Corporation to violate Delaware law. The Proposal may also be excluded pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(6) because the Corporation lacks the power to implement the Proposal.

1. *The Corporation may omit the Proposal pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(2) because implementation of the Proposal would require the Corporation to violate Delaware law.*

Rule 14a-8(i)(2) permits a company to exclude a stockholder proposal if implementation of the proposal would cause it to violate any state, federal or foreign law to which it is subject. The Corporation is incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware. For the reasons set forth below and in the legal opinion regarding Delaware law from Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A., attached hereto as Exhibit B (the "RLF Opinion"), the Corporation believes that the Proposal is excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(2) because, if implemented, the Proposal would cause the Corporation to violate the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (the "DGCL").



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The first sentence of the Proposal requests that the Board of Directors of the Corporation (the "Board") "take the steps necessary" to amend the Corporation's Bylaws and each appropriate governing document to provide the holders of 10% of the Corporation's outstanding common stock with the power to call special meetings of stockholders. The second sentence of the Proposal provides that any "exception or exclusion conditions" applying to the stockholders' power to call a special meeting must also be applied to the Corporation's "management" or the Board. One "exception or exclusion condition" imposed on the stockholders' power to call special meetings under the Proposal is their holding 10% or more of the Corporation's outstanding common stock. Accordingly, the Proposal would have the effect of requiring the directors to hold at least 10% of the Corporation's outstanding common stock to call a special meeting of stockholders. As a result, for the reasons set forth below, the Proposal, if implemented, would violate the DGCL. This conclusion is supported by the RLF Opinion.

As noted in the RLF Opinion, Section 211(d) of the DGCL governs the calling of special meetings of stockholders. That subsection provides: "Special meetings of the stockholders may be called by the board of directors or by such person or persons as may be authorized by the certificate of incorporation or by the bylaws." Thus, Section 211(d) vests the board of directors of a Delaware corporation with the power to call special meetings, but gives the corporation the authority, through its certificate of incorporation or bylaws, to give other parties the right to call special meetings. The Proposal seeks to restrict the Board's power to call special meetings (other than through an ordinary process-based bylaw). Such limitation, however, cannot be implemented through the Corporation's Bylaws. Section 141(a) of the DGCL expressly provides that if there is to be any deviation from the general mandate that the board of directors manage the business and affairs of the corporation, such deviation must be provided in the DGCL or a company's certificate of incorporation. The Corporation's Certificate of Incorporation does not provide for any limitations on the Board's power to call special meetings, and, unlike other provisions of the DGCL that allow a board's statutory authority to be modified through the bylaws, Section 211(d) does not provide that the board's power to call special meetings may be modified through the bylaws. *See* 8 Del. C. § 211(d). Further, as discussed in the RLF Opinion, "the phrase 'except as otherwise provided in this chapter' set forth in Section 141(a) [of the DGCL] does not include bylaws adopted pursuant to Section 109(b) of the [DGCL] that could disable the board entirely from exercising its statutory power." A long line of Delaware case law discusses the implicit distinction found in Section 141 of the DGCL between the roles of stockholders and directors. In Aronson v. Lewis, the Delaware Supreme Court stated, "[a] cardinal precept of the [DGCL] is that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the corporation." Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). *See also*, McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916 (Del. 2000); Quicktum Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1291 (Del. 1998). Thus, the Proposal, which seeks to amend the Corporation's Bylaws to include a provision conditioning the Board's power to call special



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meetings on the directors' ownership of at least 10% of the outstanding common stock, would, if implemented, violate the DGCL.

Because the Proposal seeks to modify or eliminate a "core" power of the Board, the Proposal may not be implemented through the Corporation's Certificate of Incorporation. Section 102(b)(1) of the DGCL provides that a certificate of incorporation may not contain any provisions contrary to the laws of the State of Delaware. As further explained in the RLF Opinion, any provision adopted pursuant to Section 102(b)(1) that is contrary to Delaware law would be invalid. See Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 118 (Del. 1952). Recently, in Jones Apparel Group, Inc. v. Maxwell Shoe Co., the Court suggested that certain statutory rights involving "core" director duties may not be modified or eliminated through a certificate of incorporation. Jones Apparel Group, Inc. v. Maxwell Shoe Co., 883 A.2d 837 (Del. Ch. 2004). In this case, the Court indicated that certain powers vested in the board, particularly those touching upon the directors' discharge of their fiduciary duties, are fundamental to the proper functioning of the corporation and therefore cannot be modified or eliminated. *Id.* at 852.

As discussed in the RLF Opinion, the board's statutory power to call special meeting without limitation or restriction under Section 211(d) of the DGCL is a "core" power reserved to the board. The RLF Opinion states that "[c]onsequently, any provision of a certificate of incorporation purporting to infringe upon that fundamental power (other than an ordinary process-based limitation) would be invalid." While a certificate of incorporation and/or bylaws may expand the ability of directors or other persons to call special meetings, a certificate of incorporation and/or bylaws may not limit the express power of the board of directors to call special meetings in the manner proposed in the Proposal.

Finally, as the RLF Opinion notes,

the "savings clause" that purports to limit the mandates of the Proposal "to the fullest extent permitted by state law" is a nullity. The "savings clause" does not resolve the conflict between the charter provision contemplated by the Proposal and the dictates of the General Corporation Law. Section 211(d), read together with Sections 102(b)(1) and 109(b), allows for no limitations on the board's power to call a special meeting (other than ordinary process-based limitations); thus, there is no "extent" to which the restriction on that power contemplated by the Proposal would otherwise be permitted by state law. In our view, the "savings clause" does little more than acknowledge that the Proposal, if implemented, would be invalid under the [DGCL].



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(footnote omitted) Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above and as supported by the RLF Opinion, the Corporation believes the Proposal is excludable pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(2) because implementation of the Proposal would cause the Corporation to violate applicable state law.

**2. *The Corporation may omit the Proposal pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(6) because it lacks the power and authority to implement the Proposal.***

Rule 14a-8(i)(6) provides that a company may omit a proposal "if the company would lack the power or authority to implement the proposal." The discussion set forth in section 1 above is incorporated herein. As noted above, the Proposal cannot be implemented without violating Delaware law and accordingly, the Corporation lacks the power and authority to implement the Proposal. The Division has consistently permitted the exclusion of stockholder proposals pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(6) if a proposal would require the company to violate the law. *See Xerox Corporation* (February 23, 2004) and *SBC Communications Inc.* (January 11, 2004). Based on the foregoing, the Corporation lacks the power and legal authority to implement the Proposal and thus, the Proposal may be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(6).

## CONCLUSION

On the basis of the foregoing and on behalf of the Corporation, we respectfully request the concurrence of the Division that the Proposal may be excluded from the Corporation's proxy materials for the 2009 Annual Meeting. Based on the Corporation's timetable for the 2009 Annual Meeting, a response from the Division by February 3, 2009 would be of great assistance.

If you have any questions or would like any additional information regarding the foregoing, please do not hesitate to contact me at 704-378-4718 or, in my absence, Teresa M. Brenner, Associate General Counsel of the Corporation, at 704-386-4238.

Please acknowledge receipt of this letter by stamping and returning the enclosed receipt copy of this letter. Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

Very truly yours,

Andrew A. Gerber

cc: Teresa M. Brenner  
John Chevedden



**HUNTON &  
WILLIAMS**

**EXHIBIT A**

Ray T. Chevedden

\*\*\*FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16\*\*\*

Mr. Kenneth D. Lewis  
Chairman  
Bank of America Corporation (BAC)  
Bank of America Corporate Center F1 18  
100 N Tryon St  
Charlotte NC 28255  
PH: 800 333-6262  
PH: 704-386-5972

NOV. 17, 2008 UPDATE

Rule 14a-8 Proposal

Dear Mr. Lewis,

This Rule 14a-8 proposal is respectfully submitted in support of the long-term performance of our company. This proposal is for the next annual shareholder meeting. Rule 14a-8 requirements are intended to be met including the continuous ownership of the required stock value until after the date of the respective shareholder meeting and the presentation of this proposal at the annual meeting. This submitted format, with the shareholder-supplied emphasis, is intended to be used for definitive proxy publication. This is the proxy for John Chevedden and/or his designee to act on my behalf regarding this Rule 14a-8 proposal for the forthcoming shareholder meeting before, during and after the forthcoming shareholder meeting. Please direct all future communications to John Chevedden (

\*\*\*FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16\*\*\*

\*\*\*FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16\*\*\*

to facilitate prompt and verifiable communications.

Your consideration and the consideration of the Board of Directors is appreciated in support of the long-term performance of our company. Please acknowledge receipt of this proposal promptly by email.

Sincerely,

Ray T. Chevedden

Ray T. Chevedden

Ray T. Chevedden and Veronica G. Chevedden Family Trust 050490  
Shareholder

10-19-08  
Date

cc: Alice A. Herald  
Corporate Secretary  
PH: 704-386-1621  
FX: 704-386-1670  
FX: 704-719-8043  
Kristin Oberheu <Kristin.M.Oberheu@bankofamerica.com>  
FX: 704-409-0985

[BAC: Rule 14a-8 Proposal, October 20, 2008, Updated November 17, 2008]

**3 – Special Shareowner Meetings**

RESOLVED, Shareowners ask our board to take the steps necessary to amend our bylaws and each appropriate governing document to give holders of 10% of our outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage allowed by law above 10%) the power to call special shareowner meetings. This includes that such bylaw and/or charter text will not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) that apply only to shareowners but not to management and/or the board.

**Statement of Ray T. Chevedden**

Special meetings allow shareowners to vote on important matters, such as electing new directors, that can arise between annual meetings. If shareowners cannot call special meetings, management may become insulated and investor returns may suffer. Shareowners should have the ability to call a special meeting when a matter is sufficiently important to merit prompt consideration.

Fidelity and Vanguard have supported a shareholder right to call a special meeting. The proxy voting guidelines of many public employee pension funds also favor this right. Governance ratings services, such as The Corporate Library and Governance Metrics International, take special meeting rights into consideration when assigning company ratings.

Merck (MRK) shareholders voted 57% in favor of a proposal for 10% of shareholders to have the right to call a special meeting. This proposal topic also won from 55% to 69%-support (based on 2008 yes and no votes) at the following companies:

Entergy (ETR)	55%	Emil Rossi (Sponsor)
International Business Machines (IBM)	56%	Emil Rossi
Kimberly-Clark (KMB)	61%	Chris Rossi
CSX Corp. (CSX)	63%	Children's Investment Fund
Occidental Petroleum (OXY)	66%	Emil Rossi
FirstEnergy Corp. (FE)	67%	Chris Rossi
Marathon Oil (MRO)	69%	Nick Rossi

Please encourage our board to respond positively to this proposal:

**Special Shareowner Meetings –  
Yes on 3**

**Notes:**

Ray T. Chevedden,

\*\*\*FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16\*\*\*

submitted this proposal.

The above format is requested for publication without re-editing, re-formatting or elimination of text, including beginning and concluding text, unless prior agreement is reached. It is respectfully requested that this proposal be proofread before it is published in the definitive proxy to ensure that the integrity of the submitted format is replicated in the proxy materials. Please advise if there is any typographical question.

Please note that the title of the proposal is part of the argument in favor of the proposal. In the interest of clarity and to avoid confusion the title of this and each other ballot item is requested to be consistent throughout all the proxy materials.

The company is requested to assign a proposal number (represented by "3" above) based on the chronological order in which proposals are submitted. The requested designation of "3" or higher number allows for ratification of auditors to be item 2.

This proposal is believed to conform with Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14B (CF), September 15, 2004 including:

Accordingly, going forward, we believe that it would not be appropriate for companies to exclude supporting statement language and/or an entire proposal in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(3) in the following circumstances:

- the company objects to factual assertions because they are not supported;
- the company objects to factual assertions that, while not materially false or misleading, may be disputed or countered;
- the company objects to factual assertions because those assertions may be interpreted by shareholders in a manner that is unfavorable to the company, its directors, or its officers; and/or
- the company objects to statements because they represent the opinion of the shareholder proponent or a referenced source, but the statements are not identified specifically as such.

See also: Sun Microsystems, Inc. (July 21, 2005).

Stock will be held until after the annual meeting and the proposal will be presented at the annual meeting. Please acknowledge this proposal promptly by email.

**HUNTON &  
WILLIAMS**

**EXHIBIT B**

**RICHARDS  
LAYTON &  
FINGER**

December 8, 2008

Bank of America Corporation  
Bank of America Corporate Center F1 18  
100 N Tryon St  
Charlotte, NC 28255

Re: Stockholder Proposal Submitted by Ray T. Chevedden

Ladies and Gentlemen:

We have acted as special Delaware counsel to Bank of America Corporation, a Delaware corporation (the "Company"), in connection with a proposal (the "Proposal") submitted by Ray T. Chevedden (the "Proponent") that the Proponent intends to present at the Company's 2009 annual meeting of stockholders (the "Annual Meeting"). In this connection, you have requested our opinion as to a certain matter under the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (the "General Corporation Law").

For the purpose of rendering our opinion as expressed herein, we have been furnished and have reviewed the following documents:

(i) the Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of the Company, as filed with the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware (the "Secretary of State") on April 28, 1999, as amended by the Certificate of Amendment of Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of the Company, as filed with the Secretary of State on March 29, 2004 (collectively, the "Certificate of Incorporation");

(ii) the Bylaws of the Company, as amended on January 24, 2007 (the "Bylaws"); and

(iii) the Proposal and the supporting statement thereto.

With respect to the foregoing documents, we have assumed: (a) the genuineness of all signatures, and the incumbency, authority, legal right and power and legal capacity under all applicable laws and regulations, of each of the officers and other persons and entities signing or whose signatures appear upon each of said documents as or on behalf of the parties thereto; (b) the conformity to authentic originals of all documents submitted to us as certified,

■ ■ ■

One Rodney Square ■ 920 North King Street ■ Wilmington, DE 19801 ■ Phone: 302-651-7700 ■ Fax: 302-651-7701

RLF1-3545842-3

[www.rlf.com](http://www.rlf.com)

conformed, photostatic, electronic or other copies; and (c) that the foregoing documents, in the forms submitted to us for our review, have not been and will not be altered or amended in any respect material to our opinion as expressed herein. For the purpose of rendering our opinion as expressed herein, we have not reviewed any document other than the documents set forth above, and, except as set forth in this opinion, we assume there exists no provision of any such other document that bears upon or is inconsistent with our opinion as expressed herein. We have conducted no independent factual investigation of our own, but rather have relied solely upon the foregoing documents, the statements and information set forth therein, and the additional matters recited or assumed herein, all of which we assume to be true, complete and accurate in all material respects.

#### The Proposal

The Proposal reads as follows:

RESOLVED, Shareowners ask our board to take the steps necessary to amend our bylaws and each appropriate governing document to give holders of 10% of our outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage allowed by law above 10%) the power to call special shareowner meetings. This includes that such bylaw and/or charter text will not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) that apply only to shareowners but not to management and/or the board.

#### Discussion

You have asked our opinion as to whether implementation of the Proposal would violate Delaware law. For the reasons set forth below, in our opinion, implementation of the Proposal by the Company would violate the General Corporation Law.

The first sentence of the Proposal requests that the Board of Directors of the Company (the "Board") "take the steps necessary" to amend the Bylaws and/or Certificate of Incorporation to provide the holders of 10% of the Company's outstanding common stock with the power to call special meetings of stockholders. The second sentence of the Proposal provides that any "exception or exclusion conditions" applying to the stockholders' power to call a special meeting must also be applied to the Company's "management" or the Board. One "exception or exclusion condition" imposed on the stockholders' power to call special meetings under the Proposal is their holding 10% or more of the Company's outstanding common stock. As applied equally to the Board pursuant to the language of the Proposal, this exception would require the directors to hold at least 10% of the Company's outstanding common stock to call a special meeting of stockholders. For purposes of this opinion, we have assumed that the Proposal would be read to have this effect. Notably, the Proposal does not seek to impose a process-based limitation on the Board's power to call special meetings (e.g., requiring unanimous Board approval to call special meetings), but instead purports to preclude the Board from calling special

meetings unless the directors have satisfied an external condition—namely, the ownership of 10% of the Company's outstanding common stock—that is unrelated to the process through which the Board makes decisions. As a result of this restriction, for the reasons set forth below, the Proposal, if implemented, would violate the General Corporation Law.

Section 211(d) of the General Corporation Law governs the calling of special meetings of stockholders. That subsection provides: "Special meetings of the stockholders may be called by the board of directors or by such person or persons as may be authorized by the certificate of incorporation or by the bylaws." 8 Del. C. § 211(d). Thus, Section 211(d) vests the board of directors with the power to call special meetings, but gives the corporation the authority, through its certificate of incorporation or bylaws, to give other parties the right to call special meetings. In considering whether implementation of the Proposal would violate the General Corporation Law, the relevant question is whether a provision conditioning the Board's power to call special meetings on the directors' ownership of at least 10% of the outstanding common stock would be valid if included in the Certificate of Incorporation or Bylaws. In our opinion, such a provision, whether included in the Certificate of Incorporation or Bylaws, would be invalid.

**A. The Provision Contemplated by the Proposal May Not Be Validly Included in the Bylaws.**

Because the Proposal seeks to restrict the Board's power to call special meetings (other than through an ordinary process-based bylaw)<sup>1</sup>, the Proposal could not be implemented through the Bylaws. The directors of a Delaware corporation are vested with the power and authority to manage the business and affairs of the corporation. Section 141(a) of the General Corporation Law provides, in relevant part, as follows:

The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of

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<sup>1</sup> The Delaware courts have distinguished "process-oriented" bylaws regulating the procedures through which board decisions are made from bylaws that purport to intrude upon the board's substantive decision-making authority. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 234-35 (Del. 2008) (footnotes omitted) ("It is well-established Delaware law that a proper function of bylaws is not to mandate how the board should decide specific substantive business decisions, but rather, to define the process and procedures by which those decisions are made. . . . Examples of the procedural, process-oriented nature of bylaws are found in both the DGCL and the case law. For example, 8 Del. C. § 141(b) authorizes bylaws that fix the number of directors on the board, the number of directors required for a quorum (with certain limitations), and the vote requirements for board action. 8 Del. C. § 141(f) authorizes bylaws that preclude board action without a meeting.").



directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.

8 Del. C. § 141(a) (emphasis added). Section 141(a) expressly provides that if there is to be any deviation from the general mandate that the board of directors manage the business and affairs of the corporation, such deviation must be provided in the General Corporation Law or the certificate of incorporation. Id.; see, e.g., Lehrman v. Cohen, 222 A.2d 800, 808 (Del. 1966). The Certificate of Incorporation does not provide for any limitations on the Board's power to call special meetings, and, unlike other provisions of the General Corporation Law that allow the Board's statutory authority to be modified through the bylaws,<sup>2</sup> Section 211(d) does not provide that the board's power to call special meetings may be modified through the bylaws. See 8 Del. C. § 211(d). Moreover, the phrase "except as otherwise provided in this chapter" set forth in Section 141(a) does not include bylaws adopted pursuant to Section 109(b) of the General Corporation Law that could disable the board entirely from exercising its statutory power. In CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 234-35 (Del. 2008), the Delaware Supreme Court, when attempting to determine "the scope of shareholder action that Section 109(b) permits yet does not improperly intrude upon the directors' power to manage [the] corporation's business and affairs under Section 141(a)," indicated that while reasonable bylaws governing the board's decision-making process are generally valid, those purporting to divest the board entirely of its substantive decision-making power and authority are not. See id. ("It is well-established Delaware law that a proper function of bylaws is not to mandate how the board should decide specific substantive business decisions, but rather, to define the process and procedures by which those decisions are made. . . . Traditionally, the bylaws have been the corporate instrument used to set forth the rules by which the corporate board conducts its business.").

The Court's observations in CA are consistent with the long line of Delaware cases highlighting the distinction implicit in Section 141(a) of the General Corporation Law between the role of stockholders and the role of the board of directors. As the Delaware Supreme Court has stated, "[a] cardinal precept of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware is that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the corporation." Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984). See also McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916 (Del. 2000) ("One of the fundamental principles of the Delaware General Corporation Law statute is that the business affairs of a corporation are managed by or under the direction of its board of directors.") (citing 8 Del. C. § 141(a)); Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1291 (Del. 1998) ("One of the most basic tenets of Delaware corporate law is that the board of directors has the ultimate responsibility for managing the business and affairs of a corporation.") (footnote omitted). The rationale for these statements is as follows:

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<sup>2</sup> For example, Section 141(f) authorizes the board to act by unanimous written consent "[u]nless otherwise restricted by the certificate of incorporation or bylaws." See 8 Del. C. § 141(f).

Stockholders are the equitable owners of the corporation's assets. However, the corporation is the legal owner of its property and the stockholders do not have any specific interest in the assets of the corporation. Instead, they have the right to share in the profits of the company and in the distribution of its assets on liquidation. Consistent with this division of interests, the directors rather than the stockholders manage the business and affairs of the corporation and the directors, in carrying out their duties, act as fiduciaries for the company and its stockholders.

Norte & Co. v. Manor Healthcare Corp., C.A. Nos. 6827, 6831, slip op. at 9 (Del. Ch. Nov. 21, 1985) (citations omitted); see also Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc., C.A. Nos. 10866, 10670, 10935, slip op. at 77-78 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) ("The corporation law does not operate on the theory that directors, in exercising their powers to manage the firm, are obligated to follow the wishes of a majority of shares."<sup>3</sup>) Because the bylaw contemplated by the Proposal would go well beyond governing the process through which the Board determines whether to call special meetings – in fact, it would potentially have the effect of disabling the Board from exercising its statutorily-granted power to call special meetings – such bylaw would be invalid under the General Corporation Law.

**B. The Provision Contemplated by the Proposal May Not Be Validly Included in the Certificate of Incorporation.**

Because the Proposal seeks to modify or eliminate a "core" power of the Board, the Proposal may not be implemented through the Certificate of Incorporation. Section 102(b)(1) of the General Corporation Law provides that a certificate of incorporation may contain:

Any provision for the management of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation, and any provision creating, defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the corporation, the directors, and the stockholders, or any class of the stockholders . . . ; if such provisions are not contrary to the laws of [the State of Delaware].

<sup>3</sup> But see UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp., 2005 WL 3529317 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2005). In that case, the Court held that a board of directors could agree, by adopting a board policy and promising not to subsequently revoke the policy, to submit the final decision whether to adopt a stockholder rights plan to a vote of the corporation's stockholders. The board's voluntary agreement to contractually limit its discretion in UniSuper, however, is distinguishable from the instant case. The bylaw contemplated by the Proposal, if adopted by the stockholders and implemented, would potentially result in stockholders divesting the Board of its statutory power to call special meetings.

8 Del. C. § 102(b)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, a corporation's ability to curtail the directors' powers through the certificate of incorporation is not without limitation. Any provision adopted pursuant to Section 102(b)(1) that is otherwise contrary to Delaware law would be invalid. In Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 118 (Del. 1952), the Court found that a charter provision is "contrary to the laws of [Delaware]" if it transgresses "a statutory enactment or a public policy settled by the common law or implicit in the General Corporation Law itself."

The Court in Loew's Theatres, Inc. v. Commercial Credit Co., 243 A.2d 78, 81 (Del. Ch. 1968), adopted this view, noting that "a charter provision which seeks to waive a statutory right or requirement is unenforceable." More recently, the Court in Jones Apparel Group, Inc. v. Maxwell Shoe Co., 883 A.2d 837 (Del. Ch. 2004), suggested that certain statutory rights involving "core" director duties may not be modified or eliminated through the certificate of incorporation. The Jones Apparel Court observed:

[Sections] 242(b)(1) and 251 do not contain the magic words ["unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation"] and they deal respectively with the fundamental subjects of certificate amendments and mergers. Can a certificate provision divest a board of its statutory power to approve a merger? Or to approve a certificate of amendment? Without answering those questions, I think it fair to say that those questions inarguably involve far more serious intrusions on core director duties than does [the provision at issue]. I also think that the use by our judiciary of a more context- and statute-specific approach to police "horribles" is preferable to a sweeping rule that denudes § 102(b)(1) of its utility and thereby greatly restricts the room for private ordering under the DGCL.

Id. at 852. While the Court in Jones Apparel recognized that certain provisions for the regulation of the internal affairs of the corporation may be made subject to modification or elimination through the private ordering system of the certificate of incorporation and bylaws, it indicated that other powers vested in the board—particularly those touching upon the directors' discharge of their fiduciary duties—are so fundamental to the proper functioning of the corporation that they cannot be so modified or eliminated. Id.

The structure of, and legislative history surrounding, Section 211(d) confirm that the board's statutory power to call special meetings, without limitation or restriction, is a "core" power reserved to the board. Consequently, any provision of the certificate of incorporation purporting to infringe upon that fundamental power (other than an ordinary process-based limitation) would be invalid. As noted above, Section 211(d) provides that "[s]pecial meetings of the stockholders may be called by the board of directors or by such person or persons as may be authorized by the certificate of incorporation or by the bylaws." Section 211(d) was adopted in 1967 as part of the wholesale revision of the General Corporation Law. In the review of Delaware's corporate law prepared for the committee tasked with submitting the revisions, it was

noted, in respect of then-proposed Section 211(d), "[m]any states specify in greater or less detail who may call special stockholder meetings," and it was "suggested that the common understanding be codified by providing that special meetings may be called by the board of directors or by any other person authorized by the by-laws or the certificate of incorporation." Ernest L. Folk, III, Review of the Delaware Corporation Law for the Delaware Corporation Law Revision Committee, at 112 (1968). It was further noted that "it is unnecessary (and for Delaware, undesirable) to vest named officers, or specified percentages of shareholders (usually 10%), with statutory, as distinguished from by-law, authority to call special meetings . . ." *Id.* The language of the statute, along with the gloss provided by the legislative history, clearly suggests that the power to call special meetings is vested by statute in the board, without limitation, and that other parties may be granted the right to do so through the certificate of incorporation and bylaws. While the certificate of incorporation and/or bylaws may expand the statutory default with regard to the calling of special meetings (i.e., parties other than the board of directors may be authorized to call special meetings), the certificate of incorporation and/or bylaws may not limit the express power of the board of directors to call special meetings, except through ordinary process-based limitations.

That the board of directors' power to call special meetings must remain unfettered (other than through ordinary process-based limitations)<sup>4</sup> is consistent with the most fundamental precept of the General Corporation Law: the board of directors is charged with a fiduciary duty to manage the business and affairs of the corporation. That duty may require the board of directors to call a special meeting at any time (regardless of the directors' ownership of the corporation's then-outstanding stock) to present a significant matter to a vote of the stockholders. Indeed, the Delaware courts have indicated that the calling of special meetings is one of the principal acts falling within the board's duty to manage the business and affairs of the corporation. See Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 134 A.2d 852, 856 (Del. Ch. 1957) (upholding a bylaw granting the corporation's president the power to call special meetings and noting that the grant of such power did "not impinge upon the statutory right and duty of the board to manage the business of the corporation"). "[T]he fiduciary duty of a Delaware director is unremitting," Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998). It does not abate during those times when the directors fail to meet a specified stock-ownership threshold. As the Delaware Supreme Court has stated, "[a] cardinal precept of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware is that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the corporation." Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811. See also Quickturn Design, 721 A.2d at 1291 ("One of the most basic tenets of Delaware corporate law is that the board of directors has the ultimate responsibility for managing the business and affairs of a corporation.") (footnote omitted).

Finally, the "savings clause" that purports to limit the mandates of the Proposal "to the fullest extent permitted by state law" is a nullity. The "savings clause" does not resolve the conflict between the charter provision contemplated by the Proposal and the dictates of the General Corporation Law. Section 211(d), read together with Sections 102(b)(1) and 109(b),

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<sup>4</sup> See *supra*, n. 1.

allows for no limitations on the board's power to call a special meeting (other than ordinary process-based limitations)<sup>5</sup>; thus, there is no "extent" to which the restriction on that power contemplated by the Proposal would otherwise be permitted by state law. In our view, the "savings clause" does little more than acknowledge that the Proposal, if implemented, would be invalid under the General Corporation Law.

**Conclusion**

Based upon and subject to the foregoing, and subject to the limitations stated herein, it is our opinion that the Proposal, if adopted by the stockholders and implemented by the Board, would be invalid under the General Corporation Law.

The foregoing opinion is limited to the General Corporation Law. We have not considered and express no opinion on any other laws or the laws of any other state or jurisdiction, including federal laws regulating securities or any other federal laws, or the rules and regulations of stock exchanges or of any other regulatory body.

The foregoing opinion is rendered solely for your benefit in connection with the matters addressed herein. We understand that you may furnish a copy of this opinion letter to the SEC in connection with the matters addressed herein and that you may refer to it in your proxy statement for the Annual Meeting, and we consent to your doing so. Except as stated in this paragraph, this opinion letter may not be furnished or quoted to, nor may the foregoing opinion be relied upon by, any other person or entity for any purpose without our prior written consent.

Very truly yours,

*Richards, Zelig J. J. J., P. A.*

CSB/TNP

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<sup>5</sup> See supra, n. 1.

**HUNTON &  
WILLIAMS**

**EXHIBIT B**

**See attached.**

**JOHN CHEVEDDEN**

\*\*\*FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16\*\*\*

\*\*\*FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16\*\*\*

December 11, 2008

Office of Chief Counsel  
Division of Corporation Finance  
Securities and Exchange Commission  
100 F Street, NE  
Washington, DC 20549

**# 1 Bank of America Corporation (BAC)  
Shareholder Position on Company No-Action Request  
Rule 14a-8 Proposal: Special Shareholder Meetings  
Ray T. Chevedden**

Ladies and Gentlemen:

This is the first response to the company December 9, 2008 no action request regarding this rule 14a-8 proposal with the following resolved statement:

**Special Shareowner Meetings**

**RESOLVED**, Shareowners ask our board to take the steps necessary to amend our bylaws and each appropriate governing document to give holders of 10% of our outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage allowed by law above 10%) the power to call special shareowner meetings. This includes that such bylaw and/or charter text will not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) that apply only to shareowners but not to management and/or the board.

The second sentence of the proposal states, "This [special shareholder meeting bylaw amendment to give holders of 10% of outstanding common stock the power to call special shareowner meetings] includes that such bylaw and/or charter text will not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) that apply only to shareowners but not to management and/or the board."

The company seems to read the proposal backwards. The primary purpose of this proposal is to give shareholders a real opportunity to call a special meeting as opposed to a hamstrung opportunity. For instance this proposal seeks to avoid an amendment that gives shareholders a right to call a special meeting yet excludes shareholders only from calling a special meeting to elect a director(s).

There is no text in the proposal that objects to the board having the power to call a special meeting or argues that the board's right to call a special meeting needs to be restricted. The company does not state that any other text in the proposal purportedly supports its backward read of the meaning of the resolved statement. It is believed the proposal seeks a certain equality (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) in opportunity to call a special meeting for shareholders and the board.

If the company insists on reading a backward and unintended meaning into the proposal, the

phrase "(to the fullest extent permitted by state law)" would prevent this proposal from having any impact on the right of the board to call a special meeting.

For these reasons it is requested that the staff find that this resolution cannot be omitted from the company proxy. It is also respectfully requested that the shareholder have the last opportunity to submit material in support of including this proposal – since the company had the first opportunity.

Sincerely,



John Chevedden

cc:

Ray T. Chevedden

Kristin Oberheu <Kristin.M.Oberheu@bankofamerica.com>



[BAC: Rule 14a-8 Proposal, October 20, 2008, Updated November 17, 2008]

**3 – Special Shareowner Meetings**

**RESOLVED**, Shareowners ask our board to take the steps necessary to amend our bylaws and each appropriate governing document to give holders of 10% of our outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage allowed by law above 10%) the power to call special shareowner meetings. This includes that such bylaw and/or charter text will not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) that apply only to shareowners but not to management and/or the board.

**Statement of Ray T. Chevedden**

Special meetings allow shareowners to vote on important matters, such as electing new directors, that can arise between annual meetings. If shareowners cannot call special meetings, management may become insulated and investor returns may suffer. Shareowners should have the ability to call a special meeting when a matter is sufficiently important to merit prompt consideration.

Fidelity and Vanguard have supported a shareholder right to call a special meeting. The proxy voting guidelines of many public employee pension funds also favor this right. Governance ratings services, such as The Corporate Library and Governance Metrics International, take special meeting rights into consideration when assigning company ratings.

Merck (MRK) shareholders voted 57% in favor of a proposal for 10% of shareholders to have the right to call a special meeting. This proposal topic also won from 55% to 69%-support (based on 2008 yes and no votes) at the following companies:

Entergy (ETR)	55%	Emil Rossi (Sponsor)
International Business Machines (IBM)	56%	Emil Rossi
Kimberly-Clark (KMB)	61%	Chris Rossi
CSX Corp. (CSX)	63%	Children's Investment Fund
Occidental Petroleum (OXY)	66%	Emil Rossi
FirstEnergy Corp. (FE)	67%	Chris Rossi
Marathon Oil (MRO)	69%	Nick Rossi

Please encourage our board to respond positively to this proposal:

**Special Shareowner Meetings –  
Yes on 3**

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**Notes:**

Ray T. Chevedden, \*\*\*FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16\*\*\* submitted this proposal.

The above format is requested for publication without re-editing, re-formatting or elimination of text, including beginning and concluding text, unless prior agreement is reached. It is respectfully requested that this proposal be proofread before it is published in the definitive proxy to ensure that the integrity of the submitted format is replicated in the proxy materials. Please advise if there is any typographical question.

Please note that the title of the proposal is part of the argument in favor of the proposal. In the interest of clarity and to avoid confusion the title of this and each other ballot item is requested to be consistent throughout all the proxy materials.

The company is requested to assign a proposal number (represented by "3" above) based on the chronological order in which proposals are submitted. The requested designation of "3" or higher number allows for ratification of auditors to be item 2.

This proposal is believed to conform with Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14B (CF), September 15, 2004 including:

Accordingly, going forward, we believe that it would not be appropriate for companies to exclude supporting statement language and/or an entire proposal in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(3) in the following circumstances:

- the company objects to factual assertions because they are not supported;
- the company objects to factual assertions that, while not materially false or misleading, may be disputed or countered;
- the company objects to factual assertions because those assertions may be interpreted by shareholders in a manner that is unfavorable to the company, its directors, or its officers; and/or
- the company objects to statements because they represent the opinion of the shareholder proponent or a referenced source, but the statements are not identified specifically as such.

See also: Sun Microsystems, Inc. (July 21, 2005).

Stock will be held until after the annual meeting and the proposal will be presented at the annual meeting. Please acknowledge this proposal promptly by email.

**JOHN CHEVEDDEN**

\*\*\*FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16\*\*\*

\*\*\*FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16\*\*\*

January 4, 2009

Office of Chief Counsel  
Division of Corporation Finance  
Securities and Exchange Commission  
100 F Street, NE  
Washington, DC 20549

**# 2 Bank of America Corporation (BAC)  
Shareholder Position on Company No-Action Request  
Rule 14a-8 Proposal by Ray T. Chevedden  
Special Shareholder Meetings**

Ladies and Gentlemen:

This is the second response to the company December 9, 2008 no action request regarding this rule 14a-8 proposal with the following resolved statement:

**Special Shareowner Meetings**

RESOLVED, Shareowners ask our board to take the steps necessary to amend our bylaws and each appropriate governing document to give holders of 10% of our outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage allowed by law above 10%) the power to call special shareowner meetings. This includes that such bylaw and/or charter text will not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) that apply only to shareowners but not to management and/or the board.

The company misinterpretation of the proposal, appears to be based on a false premise that the overwhelming purpose of shareholder proposals is to only ask the individual board members to take action on their own and only in their limited capacity as private shareholders. To the contrary most, if not all, rule 14a-8 proposals ask the board to act in its capacity as the board.

The company has not produced evidence of any rule 14a-8 shareholder proposal in which board members were asked to take action on their own and only in their limited capacity as private shareholders. And the company has not produced any evidence of a shareholder proposal with the purpose of restricting rights of the directors when they act as private shareholders. The company apparently drafts its no action based on a belief that the key to writing a no action request is to produce a number of speculative or highly speculative meanings for the resolved statements of a rule 14a-8 proposals.

This rule 14a-8 proposal does not seek to place limits on management and/or the board when members of the management and/or the board act exclusively in the capacity of individual shareholders. For instance this proposal does not seek to compel a member of management and/or the board to vote their shares with or against the proxy position of the entire board on ballot items or to require directors to buy stock.

The proposal is internally consistent. The first sentence of the proposal would empower each shareholder, without exception or exclusion, to be part of 10% of shareholders (acting in the capacity of shareholders only) able to call a special meeting. This sentence does not exclude any shareholder from being part of the 10% of shareholders. The fact that there is no exclusion of even a single shareholder – contradicts the core company “exclusion” argument. The company has not named one shareholder who would be excluded.

The company does not explain why it does not alternatively back up its (i)(3) objection by requesting that the second sentence of the resolved statement be omitted.

The company (i)(6) objection appears to be gratuitous and dependent on unqualified acceptance of its (i)(2) objection.

For these reasons it is requested that the staff find that this resolution cannot be omitted from the company proxy. It is also respectfully requested that the shareholder have the last opportunity to submit material in support of including this proposal – since the company had the first opportunity.

Sincerely,



John Chevedden

cc:

Ray T. Chevedden

Alice A. Herald <Alice.Herald@bankofamerica.com>

Ray T. Chevedden

\*\*\*FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16\*\*\*

Mr. Kenneth D. Lewis  
Chairman  
Bank of America Corporation (BAC)  
Bank of America Corporate Center Fl 18  
100 N Tryon St  
Charlotte NC 28255  
PH: 800 333-6262  
PH: 704-386-5972

NOV. 17, 2008 UPDATE

Rule 14a-8 Proposal

Dear Mr. Lewis,

This Rule 14a-8 proposal is respectfully submitted in support of the long-term performance of our company. This proposal is for the next annual shareholder meeting. Rule 14a-8 requirements are intended to be met including the continuous ownership of the required stock value until after the date of the respective shareholder meeting and the presentation of this proposal at the annual meeting. This submitted format, with the shareholder-supplied emphasis, is intended to be used for definitive proxy publication. This is the proxy for John Chevedden and/or his designee to act on my behalf regarding this Rule 14a-8 proposal for the forthcoming shareholder meeting before, during and after the forthcoming shareholder meeting. Please direct all future communications to John Chevedden

\*\*\*FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16\*\*\*

\*\*\*FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16\*\*\*

to facilitate prompt and verifiable communications.

Your consideration and the consideration of the Board of Directors is appreciated in support of the long-term performance of our company. Please acknowledge receipt of this proposal promptly by email.

Sincerely,

Ray T. Chevedden

Ray T. Chevedden

10-19-08

Date

Ray T. Chevedden and Veronica G. Chevedden Family Trust 050490  
Shareholder

cc: Alice A. Herald  
Corporate Secretary  
PH: 704-386-1621  
FX: 704-386-1670  
FX: 704-719-8043  
Kristin Oberheu <Kristin.M.Oberheu@bankofamerica.com>  
FX: 704-409-0985

**3 - Special Shareowner Meetings**

**RESOLVED**, Shareowners ask our board to take the steps necessary to amend our bylaws and each appropriate governing document to give holders of 10% of our outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage allowed by law above 10%) the power to call special shareowner meetings. This includes that such bylaw and/or charter text will not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) that apply only to shareowners but not to management and/or the board.

**Statement of Ray T. Chevedden**

Special meetings allow shareowners to vote on important matters, such as electing new directors, that can arise between annual meetings. If shareowners cannot call special meetings, management may become insulated and investor returns may suffer. Shareowners should have the ability to call a special meeting when a matter is sufficiently important to merit prompt consideration.

Fidelity and Vanguard have supported a shareholder right to call a special meeting. The proxy voting guidelines of many public employee pension funds also favor this right. Governance ratings services, such as The Corporate Library and Governance Metrics International, take special meeting rights into consideration when assigning company ratings.

Merck (MRK) shareholders voted 57% in favor of a proposal for 10% of shareholders to have the right to call a special meeting. This proposal topic also won from 55% to 69%-support (based on 2008 yes and no votes) at the following companies:

Entergy (ETR)	55%	Emil Rossi (Sponsor)
International Business Machines (IBM)	56%	Emil Rossi
Kimberly-Clark (KMB)	61%	Chris Rossi
CSX Corp. (CSX)	63%	Children's Investment Fund
Occidental Petroleum (OXY)	66%	Emil Rossi
FirstEnergy Corp. (FE)	67%	Chris Rossi
Marathon Oil (MRO)	69%	Nick Rossi

Please encourage our board to respond positively to this proposal:  
**Special Shareowner Meetings -**  
**Yes on 3**

**Notes:**

Ray T. Chevedden, \*\*\*FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16\*\*\* submitted this proposal.

The above format is requested for publication without re-editing, re-formatting or elimination of text, including beginning and concluding text, unless prior agreement is reached. It is respectfully requested that this proposal be proofread before it is published in the definitive proxy to ensure that the integrity of the submitted format is replicated in the proxy materials. Please advise if there is any typographical question.

Please note that the title of the proposal is part of the argument in favor of the proposal. In the interest of clarity and to avoid confusion the title of this and each other ballot item is requested to be consistent throughout all the proxy materials.

The company is requested to assign a proposal number (represented by "3" above) based on the chronological order in which proposals are submitted. The requested designation of "3" or higher number allows for ratification of auditors to be item 2.

This proposal is believed to conform with Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14B (CF), September 15, 2004 including:

Accordingly, going forward, we believe that it would not be appropriate for companies to exclude supporting statement language and/or an entire proposal in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(3) in the following circumstances:

- the company objects to factual assertions because they are not supported;
- the company objects to factual assertions that, while not materially false or misleading, may be disputed or countered;
- the company objects to factual assertions because those assertions may be interpreted by shareholders in a manner that is unfavorable to the company, its directors, or its officers; and/or
- the company objects to statements because they represent the opinion of the shareholder proponent or a referenced source, but the statements are not identified specifically as such.

See also: Sun Microsystems, Inc. (July 21, 2005).

Stock will be held until after the annual meeting and the proposal will be presented at the annual meeting. Please acknowledge this proposal promptly by email.

JOHN CHEVEDDEN

\*\*\*FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16\*\*\*

\*\*\*FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16\*\*\*

January 20, 2009

Office of Chief Counsel  
Division of Corporation Finance  
Securities and Exchange Commission  
100 F Street, NE  
Washington, DC 20549

**# 3 Bank of America Corporation (BAC)  
Shareholder Position on Company No-Action Request  
Rule 14a-8 Proposal by Ray T. Chevedden  
Special Shareholder Meetings**

Ladies and Gentlemen:

This further responds to the company December 9, 2008 no action request regarding this rule 14a-8 proposal with the following resolved statement:

**Special Shareowner Meetings**

RESOLVED, Shareowners ask our board to take the steps necessary to amend our bylaws and each appropriate governing document to give holders of 10% of our outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage allowed by law above 10%) the power to call special shareowner meetings. This includes that such bylaw and/or charter text will not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) that apply only to shareowners but not to management and/or the board.

The attached *Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corporation* (January 12, 2009) response may be relevant since it concerns a proposal with the same text as the Bank of America proposal:

**Special Shareowner Meetings**

RESOLVED, Shareowners ask our board to take the steps necessary to amend our bylaws and each appropriate governing document to give holders of 10% of our outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage allowed by law above 10%) the power to call special shareowner meetings. This includes that such bylaw and/or charter text will not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) that apply only to shareowners but not to management and/or the board.

Although the rule 14a-8 objections by these two companies have differences, Burlington Northern had ample time and since December 5, 2008 to add some or all of the Bank of America objections (as potentially superior objections) and did not. And Burlington Northern had the same objective as Bank of America.



For this reason and the earlier reasons it is requested that the staff find that this resolution cannot be omitted from the company proxy. It is also respectfully requested that the shareholder have the last opportunity to submit material in support of including this proposal – since the company had the first opportunity.

Sincerely,

  
John Chevedden

cc:

Ray T. Chevedden

Alice A. Herald <Alice.Herald@bankofamerica.com>

January 12, 2009

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**Response of the Office of Chief Counsel  
Division of Corporation Finance**

**Re: Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corporation  
Incoming letter dated December 5, 2008**

The proposal asks the board to take the steps necessary to amend the bylaws and each appropriate governing document to give holders of 10% of BNSF's outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage allowed by law above 10%) the power to call special shareholder meetings.

We are unable to concur in your view that BNSF may exclude the proposal or portions of the supporting statement under rule 14a-8(i)(3). Accordingly, we do not believe that BNSF may omit the proposal or portions of the supporting statement from its proxy materials in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(3).

Sincerely,

Julie F. Bell  
Attorney-Adviser

**DIVISION OF CORPORATION FINANCE  
INFORMAL PROCEDURES REGARDING SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS**

The Division of Corporation Finance believes that its responsibility with respect to matters arising under Rule 14a-8 [17 CFR 240.14a-8], as with other matters under the proxy rules, is to aid those who must comply with the rule by offering informal advice and suggestions and to determine, initially, whether or not it may be appropriate in a particular matter to recommend enforcement action to the Commission. In connection with a shareholder proposal under Rule 14a-8, the Division's staff considers the information furnished to it by the Company in support of its intention to exclude the proposals from the Company's proxy materials, as well as any information furnished by the proponent or the proponent's representative.

Although Rule 14a-8(k) does not require any communications from shareholders to the Commission's staff, the staff will always consider information concerning alleged violations of the statutes administered by the Commission, including argument as to whether or not activities proposed to be taken would be violative of the statute or rule involved. The receipt by the staff of such information, however, should not be construed as changing the staff's informal procedures and proxy review into a formal or adversary procedure.

It is important to note that the staff's and Commission's no-action responses to Rule 14a-8(j) submissions reflect only informal views. The determinations reached in these no-action letters do not and cannot adjudicate the merits of a company's position with respect to the proposal. Only a court such as a U.S. District Court can decide whether a company is obligated to include shareholder proposals in its proxy materials. Accordingly a discretionary determination not to recommend or take Commission enforcement action, does not preclude a proponent, or any shareholder of a company, from pursuing any rights he or she may have against the company in court, should the management omit the proposal from the company's proxy material.