Commitments, Contingencies and Guarantees
|9 Months Ended|
Sep. 30, 2011
|Commitments, Contingencies and Guarantees [Abstract]|
|Commitments, Contingencies and Guarantees||
Note 14. Commitments, Contingencies and Guarantees
The following supplements the disclosure in Note 14 to the Consolidated Financial Statements of Merrill Lynch’s 2010 Annual Report and in Note 14 to the Condensed Consolidated Financial Statements of Merrill Lynch’s Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q for the quarterly periods ended March 31, 2011 and June 30, 2011 (collectively, “the prior commitments, contingencies and guarantees disclosures”).
In the ordinary course of business, Merrill Lynch and its subsidiaries are routinely defendants in or parties to many pending and threatened legal actions and proceedings, including actions brought on behalf of various classes of claimants. These actions and proceedings are generally based on alleged violations of securities, environmental, employment, contract and other laws. In some of these actions and proceedings, claims for substantial monetary damages are asserted against Merrill Lynch and its subsidiaries.
In the ordinary course of business, Merrill Lynch and its subsidiaries are also subject to regulatory examinations, information gathering requests, inquiries and investigations. Certain subsidiaries of Merrill Lynch are registered broker/dealers or investment advisors and are subject to regulation by the SEC, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), the New York Stock Exchange, the U.K.’s Financial Services Authority (“FSA”) and other domestic, international and state securities regulators. In connection with formal and informal inquiries by those agencies, such subsidiaries receive numerous requests, subpoenas and orders for documents, testimony and information in connection with various aspects of their regulated activities.
In view of the inherent difficulty of predicting the outcome of such litigation and regulatory matters, particularly where the claimants seek very large or indeterminate damages or where the matters present novel legal theories or involve a large number of parties, Merrill Lynch generally cannot predict what the eventual outcome of the pending matters will be, what the timing of the ultimate resolution of these matters will be, or what the eventual loss, fines or penalties related to each pending matter may be.
In accordance with applicable accounting guidance, Merrill Lynch establishes an accrued liability for litigation and regulatory matters when those matters present loss contingencies that are both probable and estimable. In such cases, there may be an exposure to loss in excess of any amounts accrued. When a loss contingency is not both probable and estimable, Merrill Lynch does not establish an accrued liability. As a litigation or regulatory matter develops, Merrill Lynch, in conjunction with any outside counsel handling the matter, evaluates on an ongoing basis whether such matter presents a loss contingency that is probable and estimable. If, at the time of evaluation, the loss contingency related to a litigation or regulatory matter is not both probable and estimable, the matter will continue to be monitored for further developments that would make such loss contingency both probable and estimable. Once the loss contingency related to a litigation or regulatory matter is deemed to be both probable and estimable, Merrill Lynch will establish an accrued liability with respect to such loss contingency and record a corresponding amount of litigation-related expense. Merrill Lynch continues to monitor the matter for further developments that could affect the amount of the accrued liability that has been previously established. Excluding expenses of internal or external legal service providers, litigation-related expenses of approximately $390 million and $670 million were recognized for the three and nine months ended September 30, 2011 as compared with approximately $250 million and $430 million for the three and nine months ended September 30, 2010.
For a limited number of the matters disclosed in this Note and in the prior commitments, contingencies and guarantees disclosures, for which a loss is probable or reasonably possible in future periods, whether in excess of a related accrued liability or where there is no accrued liability, Merrill Lynch is able to estimate a range of possible loss. In determining whether it is possible to provide an estimate of loss or range of possible loss, Merrill Lynch reviews and evaluates its material litigation and regulatory matters on an ongoing basis, in conjunction with any outside counsel handling the matter, in light of potentially relevant factual and legal developments. These may include information learned through the discovery process, rulings on dispositive motions, settlement discussions, and other rulings by courts, arbitrators or others. In cases in which Merrill Lynch possesses sufficient appropriate information to develop an estimate of loss or range of possible loss, that estimate is aggregated and disclosed below. There may be other disclosed matters for which a loss is probable or reasonably possible but such an estimate may not be possible. For those matters where an estimate is possible, management currently estimates the aggregate range of possible loss is $0 to $1.3 billion in excess of the accrued liability (if any) related to those matters. This estimated range of possible loss is based upon currently available information and is subject to significant judgment and a variety of assumptions, and known and unknown uncertainties. The matters underlying the estimated range will change from time to time, and actual results may vary significantly from the current estimate. Those matters for which an estimate is not possible are not included within this estimated range. Therefore, this estimated range of possible loss represents what Merrill Lynch believes to be an estimate of possible loss only for certain matters meeting these criteria. It does not represent Merrill Lynch’s maximum loss exposure. Information is provided below, or in the prior commitments, contingencies and guarantees disclosures, regarding the nature of all of these contingencies and, where specified, the amount of the claim associated with these loss contingencies. Based on current knowledge, management does not believe that loss contingencies arising from pending matters, including the matters described herein or in the prior commitments, contingencies and guarantees disclosures, will have a material adverse effect on the consolidated financial position or liquidity of Merrill Lynch. However, in light of the inherent uncertainties involved in these matters, some of which are beyond Merrill Lynch’s control, and the very large or indeterminate damages sought in some of these matters, an adverse outcome in one or more of these matters could be material to Merrill Lynch’s results of operations or cash flows for any particular reporting period.
In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation
On August 25, 2011, the district court, on remand from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, dismissed the objection by the last remaining putative class member. On September 23, 2011, the objector filed a notice of appeal challenging the district court’s dismissal of the objection to the settlement.
Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. Litigation
On September 23, 2011, the majority of the underwriter defendants, including BAS, MLPF&S and approximately 40 others, reached an agreement in principle with the lead plaintiffs to settle the securities class action as to the settling underwriters. The settlement is subject to court approval. MLFP&S’s portion of the settlement is not material to Merrill Lynch’s results of operations or financial condition.
Mortgage-Backed Securities Litigation
Merrill Lynch entities and their affiliates have been named as defendants in several cases relating to their various roles as issuer, originator, seller, depositor, sponsor, underwriter and/or controlling entity in MBS offerings, pursuant to which the MBS investors were entitled to a portion of the cash flow from the underlying pools of mortgages. These cases generally include purported class action suits and actions by individual MBS purchasers. Although the allegations vary by lawsuit, these cases generally allege that the registration statements, prospectuses and prospectus supplements for securities issued by securitization trusts contained material misrepresentations and omissions, in violation of Sections 11, 12 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, Sections 10(b) and 20 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and/or state securities laws and other state statutory and common laws.
These cases generally involve allegations of false and misleading statements regarding: (i) the process by which the properties that served as collateral for the mortgage loans underlying the MBS were appraised; (ii) the percentage of equity that mortgage borrowers had in their homes; (iii) the borrowers’ ability to repay their mortgage loans; (iv) the underwriting practices by which those mortgage loans were originated; (v) the ratings given to the different tranches of MBS by rating agencies; and (vi) the validity of each issuing trust’s title to the mortgage loans comprising the pool for the securitization (collectively “MBS Claims”). Plaintiffs in these cases generally seek unspecified compensatory damages, unspecified costs and legal fees and, in some instances, seek rescission. A number of other entities (including the National Credit Union Administration) have threatened legal actions against Merrill Lynch and its affiliates concerning MBS offerings.
On August 8, 2011, American International Group, Inc. and certain of its affiliates (collectively, “AIG”) filed a complaint in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County, in a case entitled American International Group, Inc. et al. v. Bank of America Corporation et al. AIG has named, among others, Merrill Lynch and a number of its affiliates, subsidiaries and entities as defendants. AIG’s complaint asserts certain MBS Claims under federal securities and common law pertaining to 349 MBS offerings, 145 of which relate to Merrill Lynch entities, in which AIG alleges that it purchased securities between 2005 and 2007. AIG seeks rescission of its purchases or a rescissory measure of damages or, in the alternative, compensatory damages of not less than $10 billion as to all defendants, including the Merrill Lynch defendants; punitive damages; and other unspecified relief. Defendants removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, which has denied AIG’s motion to remand the case to state court.
Cambridge Place Investment Management Litigation
Both Cambridge Place Investment Management matters were remanded to the Massachusetts Superior Court for Suffolk County.
Charles Schwab Litigation
The Charles Schwab matter was remanded to the Superior Court of California for the County of San Francisco. On October 13, 2011, plaintiffs dismissed the federal claims with prejudice.
Federal Home Loan Bank Litigations
Both Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago matters have been remanded to the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois and the Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles, respectively.
In the Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago action pending in California, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint on September 15, 2011 adding Bank of America and MLPF&S as defendants and asserting new claims against BAS and Countrywide entities. The amended complaint includes successor liability claims against Bank of America as successor to Countrywide and against MLPF&S as successor to BAS.
In the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco matters, plaintiffs dismissed the federal claims with prejudice on August 11, 2011. On September 8, 2011, the court denied the defendant’s motions to dismiss the state law claims in these actions.
On August 15, 2011, the court denied defendants’ remaining motions to dismiss in the Federal Home Loan Bank of Seattle actions.
Federal Housing Finance Agency Litigation
On September 2, 2011, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”), as conservator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, filed complaints against Bank of America, BAS, MLPF&S and other related entities, and certain current and former officers and directors of these entities in two separate actions. The actions are entitled, Federal Housing Finance Agency v. Bank of America Corporation, et al., and Federal Housing Finance Agency v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., et al., both filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.
The complaints assert certain MBS Claims relating to MBS issued and/or underwritten by Bank of America, BAS, MLPF&S and other entities between 2005 and 2008 and purchased by either Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac in their investment portfolio. The complaints assert claims under both federal securities laws and state common law. The FHFA seeks among other relief rescission of the consideration Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac paid for the securities or alternatively damages allegedly incurred by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The FHFA also seeks recovery of punitive damages in the Merrill Lynch action.
Merrill Lynch MBS Litigation
On October 20, 2011, the parties reached an agreement in principle to settle the action. The settlement is subject to court approval.
Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP (Merrill Lynch) Litigation
On August 19, 2010, Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP (“ABP”) filed a complaint against Merrill Lynch, Merrill Lynch Mortgage Lending, Inc., Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. (“MLMI”), MLPF&S, First Franklin Financial Corporation (“First Franklin”), and certain current and former directors of MLMI, as well as certain other defendants, in the Supreme Court of New York, New York County, entitled Stichting Pensioenfonds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., et al. Defendants have removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. ABP’s original complaint asserted certain MBS Claims relating to 13 offerings of Merrill Lynch-related MBS. On October 12, 2011, ABP filed an amended complaint regarding the same offerings and adding additional federal securities law and state law claims. ABP seeks unspecified compensatory damages, interest and legal fees, or alternatively rescission.
Region of Puglia, Italy Criminal Investigation
On September 2, 2011, the public prosecutor in Bari, Puglia filed a request with the court in Bari for the criminal proceedings against Merrill Lynch’s employee and the other named individuals, as well as the related claim under Law 231 against Merrill Lynch International and another party, to proceed to a preliminary hearing.
At September 30, 2011, Merrill Lynch’s commitments had the following expirations:
Merrill Lynch enters into commitments to extend credit, predominantly at variable interest rates, in connection with corporate finance, corporate and institutional transactions and asset-based lending transactions. Clients may also be extended loans or lines of credit collateralized by first and second mortgages on real estate, certain liquid assets of small businesses, or securities. These commitments usually have a fixed expiration date and are contingent on certain contractual conditions that may require payment of a fee by the counterparty. Once commitments are drawn upon, Merrill Lynch may require the counterparty to post collateral depending upon creditworthiness and general market conditions. See Note 10 for additional information.
Commitments to extend credit are outstanding as of the date the commitment letter is issued and are comprised of closed and contingent commitments. Closed commitments represent the unfunded portion of existing commitments available for draw down. Contingent commitments are contingent on the borrower fulfilling certain conditions or upon a particular event, such as an acquisition. A portion of these contingent commitments may be syndicated among other lenders or the counterparty may replace the commitment with capital markets funding.
The contractual amounts of these commitments represent the amounts at risk should the contract be fully drawn upon, the client defaults, and the value of the existing collateral becomes worthless. The total amount of outstanding commitments may not represent future cash requirements, as commitments may expire without being drawn.
For lending commitments where the loan will be classified as held for sale upon funding, liabilities associated with unfunded commitments are calculated at the lower of cost or fair value, capturing declines in the fair value of the respective credit risk. For loan commitments where the loan will be classified as held for investment upon funding, liabilities are calculated considering both market and historical loss rates. Loan commitments either held by entities that apply the Broker-Dealer Guide or for which the fair value option was elected are accounted for at fair value.
Purchasing and Other Commitments
Merrill Lynch had commitments to purchase partnership interests, primarily related to private equity and principal investing activities, of $0.4 billion and $0.6 billion at September 30, 2011 and December 31, 2010, respectively. Merrill Lynch also has entered into agreements with providers of market data, communications, systems consulting, and other office-related services. At September 30, 2011 and December 31, 2010, minimum fee commitments over the remaining life of these agreements totaled $1.5 billion and $1.7 billion, respectively. Merrill Lynch entered into commitments to purchase loans of $3.4 billion, which, upon settlement of the commitment, will be included in trading assets, loans held for investment or loans held for sale at September 30, 2011. Such commitments totaled $2.6 billion at December 31, 2010. Other purchasing commitments amounted to $1.6 billion and $0.8 billion at September 30, 2011 and December 31, 2010, respectively.
In the normal course of business, Merrill Lynch enters into commitments for underwriting transactions. Settlement of these transactions as of September 30, 2011 would not have a material effect on the Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheet of Merrill Lynch.
In connection with trading activities, Merrill Lynch enters into commitments to enter into resale and securities borrowing and also repurchase and securities lending agreements.
Merrill Lynch has entered into various non-cancelable long-term lease agreements for premises that expire through 2028. Merrill Lynch has also entered into various non-cancelable short-term lease agreements, which are primarily commitments of less than one year under equipment leases.
Merrill Lynch issues various guarantees to counterparties in connection with certain transactions. Merrill Lynch’s guarantee arrangements and their expiration at September 30, 2011 are summarized as follows (see Note 6 for information related to derivative financial instruments within the scope of Guarantees Accounting):
Standby Liquidity Facilities
Standby liquidity facilities are primarily comprised of liquidity facilities provided to certain unconsolidated municipal bond securitization VIEs. In these arrangements, Merrill Lynch is required to fund these standby liquidity facilities if certain contingent events take place (e.g., a failed remarketing) and in certain cases if the fair value of the assets held by the VIE declines below the stated amount of the liquidity obligation. The potential exposure under the facilities is mitigated by economic hedges and/or other contractual arrangements entered into by Merrill Lynch. Based upon historical activity, it is considered remote that future payments would need to be made under these guarantees.
Refer to Note 9 for further information.
Residual Value Guarantees
At September 30, 2011, residual value guarantees of $415 million consist of amounts associated with certain power plant facilities. Payments under these guarantees would only be required if the fair value of such assets declined below their guaranteed value. As of September 30, 2011, no payments have been made under these guarantees and the carrying value of the associated liabilities was not material, as Merrill Lynch believes that the estimated fair value of such assets was in excess of their guaranteed value.
Standby Letters of Credit and Other Guarantees
Merrill Lynch provides guarantees to certain counterparties in the form of standby letters of credit in the amount of $0.5 billion. Payment risk is evaluated based upon historical payment activity.
Representations and Warranties
In prior years, Merrill Lynch and certain of its subsidiaries, including First Franklin sold pools of first-lien residential mortgage loans and home equity loans as private-label securitizations (in a limited number of these securitizations, monolines insured all or some of the securities), or in the form of whole loans. Most of the loans sold in the form of whole loans were subsequently pooled into private-label securitizations sponsored by the third-party buyer of the whole loans. In addition, Merrill Lynch and First Franklin securitized first-lien residential mortgage loans generally in the form of mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by the GSEs. In connection with these transactions, Merrill Lynch made various representations and warranties. These representations and warranties, as governed by the agreements, related to, among other things, the ownership of the loan, the validity of the lien securing the loan, the absence of delinquent taxes or liens against the property securing the loan, the process used to select the loan for inclusion in a transaction, the loan’s compliance with any applicable loan criteria, including underwriting standards, and the loan’s compliance with applicable federal, state and local laws. Breaches of these representations and warranties may result in the requirement to repurchase mortgage loans or to otherwise make whole or provide other remedies to the GSEs, whole-loan buyers, securitization trusts or monoline insurers (collectively, “repurchases”). In such cases, Merrill Lynch would be exposed to any credit loss on the repurchased mortgage loans after accounting for any mortgage insurance or mortgage guaranty payments that it may receive.
Subject to the requirements and limitations of the applicable sales and securitization agreements, these representations and warranties can be enforced by the GSEs, the whole-loan buyer, the securitization trustee, or others as governed by the applicable agreement or, in a limited number of first-lien and home equity securitizations where monoline insurers have insured all or some of the securities issued, by the monoline insurer at any time. In the case of loans sold to parties other than the GSEs, the contractual liability to repurchase typically arises only if there is a breach of the representations and warranties that materially and adversely affects the interest of the investor or investors in the loan or of the monoline insurer (as applicable). Contracts with the GSEs do not contain an equivalent requirement. Merrill Lynch believes that the longer a loan performs prior to default, the less likely it is that an alleged breach of representations and warranties had a material impact on the loan’s performance. Historically, most demands for repurchase have occurred within the first several years after origination, generally after a loan has defaulted.
Merrill Lynch’s credit loss would be reduced by any recourse it may have to organizations (e.g., correspondents) that, in turn, had sold such loans to Merrill Lynch based upon its agreements with these organizations. When a loan is originated by a correspondent or other third party, Merrill Lynch typically has the right to seek a recovery of related repurchase losses from that originator. Many of the correspondent originators of loans in 2004 through 2008 are no longer in business and Merrill Lynch is unable to recover valid claims.
The fair value of the obligations to be absorbed under the representations and warranties provided is recorded as an accrued liability when the loans are sold. This liability for probable losses is updated by accruing a representations and warranties provision in non-interest expenses on the Condensed Consolidated Statement of Earnings (Loss). This is done throughout the life of the loan, as necessary when additional relevant information becomes available. The methodology used to estimate the liability for representations and warranties is a function of the representations and warranties given and considers a variety of factors, which include, depending on the counterparty, actual defaults, estimated future defaults, historical loss experience, estimated home prices, other economic conditions, estimated probability that a repurchase claim will be received, consideration of whether presentation thresholds will be met, number of payments made by the borrower prior to default and estimated probability that a loan will be required to be repurchased. Merrill Lynch also considers bulk settlements, including those of its affiliates, when determining its estimated liability for representations and warranties. The estimate of the liability for representations and warranties is based upon currently available information, significant judgment, and a number of factors, including those set forth above, that are subject to change. Changes to any one of these factors could significantly impact the estimate of the liability and could have a material adverse impact on Merrill Lynch’s results of operations for any particular period. Given that these factors vary by counterparty, Merrill Lynch analyzes representations and warranties obligations based on the specific counterparty, or type of counterparty, with whom the sale was made.
Merrill Lynch has contested, and will continue to vigorously contest any request for repurchase when it concludes that a valid basis for repurchase does not exist. Merrill Lynch may reach settlements in the future if opportunities arise on terms it believes to be advantageous to Merrill Lynch.
Bank of America BNY Mellon Settlement
On June 28, 2011, Bank of America and certain of its non-Merrill Lynch subsidiaries entered into a settlement agreement (subject to final court approval and certain other conditions) with The Bank of New York Mellon (“BNY Mellon”), as trustee, to resolve, among other claims, all outstanding and potential claims related to alleged representations and warranties breaches (including repurchase claims) with respect to the 525 legacy first-lien and five second-lien non-GSE residential mortgage-backed securitization trusts containing loans principally originated between 2004 and 2008 and for which BNY Mellon acts as trustee or indenture trustee (the “BNY Mellon Settlement”). As a result of the experience gained by Bank of America and certain of its non-Merrill Lynch affiliates in the BNY Mellon Settlement, Merrill Lynch determined that it had sufficient experience to record a $2.7 billion liability for representations and warranties related to its repurchase exposure on private-label securitizations in the nine months ended September 30, 2011.
Unresolved Claims and Payments
The table below presents unresolved repurchase claims by counterparty at September 30, 2011 and December 31, 2010.
The pipeline of unresolved claims where Merrill Lynch believes a valid defect has not been identified which would constitute an actionable breach of representations and warranties was $599 million at September 30, 2011. Through September 30, 2011, approximately 9% of unresolved claims that Merrill Lynch initially denied have subsequently been resolved through repurchase or reimbursement payments and 27% have been resolved through rescission. When a claim has been denied and there has not been communication with the counterparty for six months, Merrill Lynch views these claims as inactive; however, they remain in the unresolved claims balance until resolution.
As presented in the table below, during the three and nine months ended September 30, 2011, Merrill Lynch paid $16 million and $41 million to resolve $26 million and $51 million of repurchase claims through repurchase or indemnification payments to investors, resulting in a loss on the related loans at the time of repurchase or indemnification payment of $11 million and $36 million. During both the three and nine months ended September 30, 2010, Merrill Lynch paid $39 million to resolve $50 million of repurchase claims through indemnification payments to investors for losses they incurred, resulting in a loss on the related loans at the time of repurchase or indemnification payment of $34 million. Cash paid for loan repurchases includes the unpaid principal balance of the loan plus past due interest. The amount of loss for loan repurchases is reduced by the fair value of the underlying loan collateral.
The repurchase of loans and indemnification payments related to repurchase claims generally resulted from material breaches of representations and warranties related to the loans’ material compliance with the applicable underwriting standards, including borrower misrepresentation, credit exceptions without sufficient compensating factors and non-compliance with underwriting procedures, although the actual representations and warranties made in a sales transaction and the resulting repurchase and indemnification activity can vary by transaction or investor. A direct relationship between the type of defect that causes the breach of representations and warranties and the severity of the realized loss has not been observed.
Liability for Representations and Warranties
The liability for representations and warranties is included in Interest and other payables on the Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets, and the related provision is included in Non-interest expenses on the Condensed Consolidated Statements of Earnings (Loss). The table below presents a rollforward of the liability for representations and warranties and includes the provisions for non-GSE representation and warranties exposure recorded in the three and nine months ended September 30, 2011.
The liability for representations and warranties is established when those obligations are both probable and reasonably estimable. As noted above, in the nine months ended September 30, 2011, Merrill Lynch recorded a provision for representations and warranties related to its repurchase exposure on private-label securitizations of $2.7 billion. The representations and warranties provision may vary significantly each period as the methodology used to estimate the expense continues to be refined based on the level and type of repurchase requests presented, defects identified, the latest experience gained on repurchase requests and other relevant facts and circumstances.
Estimated Range of Possible Loss
Merrill Lynch believes it is probable that additional claimants may come forward with credible claims that meet the requirements of the terms of the securitizations. Merrill Lynch believes that with the additional $2.7 billion non-GSE representations and warranties provision recorded in the nine months ended September 30, 2011, related to the BNY Mellon Settlement, it has provided for a substantial portion of its non-GSE representations and warranties exposures. However, it is reasonably possible that future representations and warranties losses may occur in excess of the amounts recorded for these exposures. In addition, Merrill Lynch has not recorded any representations and warranties liability for potential monoline exposures and certain potential whole loan exposures. Merrill Lynch currently estimates that the range of possible loss related to non-GSE representations and warranties exposure as of September 30, 2011 could be up to $0.5 billion over existing accruals. This estimate of the range of possible loss for non-GSE representations and warranties does not represent a probable loss, is based on currently available information, significant judgment, and a number of assumptions, including those set forth below, that are subject to change.
The methodology used to estimate the non-GSE representations and warranties liability and the corresponding range of possible loss considers a variety of factors including Merrill Lynch’s experience related to actual defaults, projected future defaults, historical loss experience, estimated home prices, other economic conditions and the experience of Merrill Lynch’s affiliates. Among the factors that impact the non-GSE representations and warranties liability and the corresponding range of possible loss are: (1) contractual loss causation requirements, (2) the representations and warranties provided, and (3) the requirement to meet certain presentation thresholds. The first factor is based on Merrill Lynch’s belief that a non-GSE contractual liability to repurchase a loan generally arises only if the counterparties prove there is a breach of representations and warranties that materially and adversely affects the interest of the investor or all investors, or the monoline insurer (as applicable), in a securitization trust and, accordingly, Merrill Lynch believes that the repurchase claimants must prove that the alleged representations and warranties breach was the cause of the loss. The second factor is related to the fact that non-GSE securitizations include different types of representations and warranties than those provided to the GSEs. Merrill Lynch believes the non-GSE securitizations’ representations and warranties are less rigorous and actionable than the explicit provisions of comparable agreements with the GSEs without regard to any variations that may have arisen as a result of dealings with the GSEs. The third factor is related to the fact that certain presentation thresholds need to be met in order for any repurchase claim to be asserted under the non-GSE agreements. A securitization trustee may investigate or demand repurchase on its own action, and most agreements contain a threshold, for example 25% of the voting rights per trust, that allows investors to declare a servicing event of default under certain circumstances or to request certain action, such as requesting loan files, that the trustee may choose to accept and follow, exempt from liability, provided the trustee is acting in good faith. If there is an uncured servicing event of default, and the trustee fails to bring suit during a 60-day period, then, under most agreements, investors may file suit. In addition to this, most agreements also allow investors to direct the securitization trustee to investigate loan files or demand the repurchase of loans, if security holders hold a specified percentage, for example, 25%, of the voting rights of each tranche of the outstanding securities. Although Merrill Lynch continues to believe that presentation thresholds are a factor in the determination of probable loss, given the BNY Mellon Settlement, the upper end of the estimated range of possible loss assumes that the presentation threshold can be met for all of the non-GSE securitization transactions.
In addition, in the case of private-label securitizations, the methodology used to estimate the non-GSE representations and warranties liability and the corresponding range of possible loss considers the experience resulting from the BNY Mellon Settlement and assumes that the conditions to the BNY Mellon Settlement are satisfied. Since the non-GSE transactions that were included in the BNY Mellon Settlement differ from those that were not included in the BNY Mellon Settlement, Merrill Lynch adjusted the experience implied in the settlement in order to determine the estimated non-GSE representations and warranties liability and corresponding range of possible loss. The judgmental adjustments made include consideration of the differences in the mix of products in the securitizations, loan originator, likelihood of claims differences, the differences in the number of payments that the borrower has made prior to default, and the sponsor of the securitization.
Future provisions and/or ranges of possible loss for non-GSE representations and warranties may be significantly impacted if actual results are different from Merrill Lynch’s assumptions in its predictive models, including, without limitation, those regarding the ultimate resolution of the BNY Mellon Settlement, estimated repurchase rates, economic conditions, home prices, consumer and counterparty behavior, and a variety of judgmental factors. Adverse developments with respect to one or more of the assumptions underlying the liability for representations and warranties and the corresponding estimated range of possible loss could result in significant increases to future provisions and/or this range of possible loss estimate. For example, if courts were to disagree with Merrill Lynch’s interpretation that the underlying agreements require a claimant to prove that the representations and warranties breach was the cause of the loss, it could significantly impact this estimated range of possible loss. Additionally, if recent court rulings related to monoline litigation, including one related to an affiliate of Merrill Lynch, that have allowed sampling of loan files instead of a loan-by-loan review to determine if a representations and warranties breach has occurred are followed generally by the courts, private-label securitization investors may view litigation as a more attractive alternative as compared to a loan-by-loan review. Finally, although Merrill Lynch believes that the representations and warranties typically given in non-GSE transactions are less rigorous and actionable than those given in GSE transactions, Merrill Lynch does not have significant loan-level experience to measure the impact of these differences on the probability that a loan will be repurchased.
There can be no assurance that final court approval of the BNY Mellon Settlement will be obtained, that all conditions to the BNY Mellon Settlement will be satisfied or, if certain conditions in the BNY Mellon Settlement permitting withdrawal are met, that Bank of America and certain of its non-Merrill Lynch subsidiaries will not determine to withdraw from the settlement. If final court approval is not obtained or if Bank of America and such subsidiaries determine to withdraw from the BNY Mellon Settlement in accordance with its terms, Merrill Lynch’s future representations and warranties losses could be substantially greater than existing accruals and the estimated range of possible losses over existing accruals described above. Under an order entered by the court in connection with the BNY Mellon Settlement, potentially interested persons had the opportunity to give notice of an intent to object to the settlement (including on the basis that more information was needed) until August 30, 2011. Approximately 44 groups or entities appeared prior to the deadline. Certain of these groups or entities filed notices of intent to object, made motions to intervene or both filed motions to intervene and notices to object. These motions have not yet been ruled on by the court. A number of investors opposed to the settlement removed the proceeding to federal court. In addition, the federal court denied BNY Mellon’s motion to remand the proceeding to state court and BNY Mellon, as well as investors that have intervened in support of the BNY Mellon Settlement, have petitioned to appeal the denial of this motion. It is currently not possible to predict how many of the parties who have appeared in the court proceeding will ultimately object to the BNY Mellon Settlement, whether the objections will prevent receipt of final court approval or the ultimate outcome of the court approval process, which can include appeals and could take a substantial period of time. In particular, the conduct of discovery and the resolution of the objections to the settlement and any appeals could take a substantial period of time and these factors, along with the recent removal of the proceeding to federal court, could materially delay the timing of final court approval. Accordingly, it is not possible to predict when the court approval process will be completed.
The liability for obligations under representations and warranties with respect to GSE and non-GSE exposures and the corresponding estimate of the range of possible loss for non-GSE representations and warranties exposures do not include any losses related to litigation matters disclosed in Note 14, nor do they include any potential securities law or fraud claims or potential indemnity or other claims against us. Merrill Lynch is not able to reasonably estimate the amount of any possible loss with respect to any such securities law (except to the extent reflected in the aggregate range of possible loss for litigation and regulatory matters disclosed in Note 14), fraud or other claims against Merrill Lynch; however, such loss could be material.
Whole Loan Sales and Private-label Securitizations Experience
The majority of repurchase claims that Merrill Lynch has received are from third-party whole loan investors. In connection with those transactions, Merrill Lynch provided representations and warranties, and the whole loan investors may retain those rights even when the loans were aggregated with other collateral into private-label securitizations sponsored by the whole-loan investors. Properly presented repurchase claims for these whole loans are reviewed on a loan-by-loan basis. If, after Merrill Lynch’s review, it does not believe a claim is valid, it will deny the claim and generally indicate a reason for the denial. When the counterparty agrees with Merrill Lynch’s denial of the claim, the counterparty may rescind the claim. When there is disagreement as to the resolution of the claim, meaningful dialogue and negotiation between the parties is generally necessary to reach conclusion on an individual claim. Generally, a whole loan sale claimant is engaged in the repurchase process and Merrill Lynch and the claimant reach resolution, either through loan-by-loan negotiation or at times, through a bulk settlement. Although the timeline for resolution varies, once an actionable breach is identified on a given loan, settlement is generally reached as to that loan within 60 to 90 days. When a claim has been denied and Merrill Lynch does not have communication with the counterparty for six months, Merrill Lynch views these claims as inactive; however, they remain in the outstanding claims balance until resolution.
Merrill Lynch and its affiliates have limited experience with loan-level private-label securitization repurchases as the number of valid repurchase claims received has been limited. In private-label securitizations certain presentation thresholds need to be met in order for any repurchase claim to be asserted by investors. The representations and warranties, as governed by the private-label securitization agreements, generally require that counterparties have the ability to both assert a claim and actually prove that a loan has an actionable defect under the applicable contracts. While Merrill Lynch believes the agreements for private-label securitizations generally contain less rigorous representations and warranties and place higher burdens on investors seeking repurchases than the express provisions of comparable agreements with the GSEs without regard to any variations that may have arisen as a result of the dealings with the GSEs, the agreements generally include a representation that underwriting practices were prudent and customary.
See Note 14 to the Consolidated Financial Statements contained in the 2010 Annual Report for additional information on guarantees.
The entire disclosure for commitments, contingencies, and guarantees.